Tactical analysis: Arsenal 2-2 Schalke

After going two goals behind in the first half, Schalke came back to pick up a deserved point against Arsenal at Veltins Arena.

Both managers played their normal 4-2-3-1 formations. Arsene Wenger gave Theo Walcott the start over Aaron Ramsey on the right. Andre Santos had a miserable night at left back when Schalke beat Arsenal 2-0 a fortnight ago so Wenger shuffled Thomas Vermaelen to left back and brought in Laurent Koscielny to play along side Per Mertersacker in the center of defense.

The only change Huub Stevens made to his team from the last time these sides met was swapping Marco Hoger with Jermaine Jones.

Early Moments
In the opening 15 minutes of the game both teams got players behind the ball defensively rather than pressing. Both back fours pushed forward towards the bank of midfielders, keeping the space the opposition had to play in very compact. The two sets of holding midfielders sat close in front of the back four and checked runs into that area. It appeared both managers were concerned about giving the opposition center attacking midfielder space in between the seams. This makes sense. Both Santi Cazorla and Lewis Holtby are clever at finding pockets of space and have the ability to pick out decisive penetrating passes. It also wasn't all that surprising both teams had set up to counter. Away from home Arsenal didn't want to open themselves up too much in the early stages and expose themselves to counters. Schalke are terrific at breaking forward quickly through Holtby, Ibrahim Afellay and Jefferson Farfan and constantly looked dangerous on the counter when the teams met in London.


It was also apparent in the early stages that Arsenal were placing responsibility on Lucas Podolski and Walcott to drop in defensively and provide help to Vermaelen and Bacary Sagna. Schalke like to get their outside backs forward and when these teams last met a fortnight ago, Podolski did a poor job tracking Uchida when he advanced forward from right back. This left Andre Santos, a left back not known for his defensive qualities, exposed to overloads with Uchida and Farfan. Farfan had found it easy to get around Santos and cut in towards the near post all evening and Schalke created a number of dangerous chances from the right. With Podolski and Walcott recovering to help defensively this time around, Farfan and Afellay did not enjoy the same amount of space on the flanks early on they had at the Emirates.

Arsenal go 2-0 up
Arsenal went up 2-0 inside half an hour without ever looking especially threatening. The opener on 16 minutes came from a comedy of errors- Neustadter's failed back header put Giroud through on goal only for the Frenchman to get his attempt on goal horribly wrong; his blushes spared however when the ball fell kindly for the trailing Walcott. Schalke were then forced to replace Uchida at right back on 25 minutes, bringing in Hoger, a midfielder by trade. Hoger's defensive weaknesses were exposed immediately. Within a minute of his introduction he was beaten easily by Podolski on the left who played in an expert cross to the front post for Giroud to head home. Neither goal was particularly indicative of an overarching tactical battle that had been emerging- the first was simply a bad mistake from Neustadter, the second poor defending from Hoger coupled with a training ground cross and finish combination from Podolski and Giroud. It should be noted however that Arsenal's second started with a move that saw Jack Wilshere receive a pass level with the Schalke back four, highlighting his ability to play as a box-to-box midfielder and join in the attack around the penalty area.

The early goals did however change the tactics for the remainder of the game. At 2-0 up away from home, Walcott and Podolski began dropping even deeper to provide defensive cover. With Schalke now forced to chase the game, they began to push the outside backs Fuchs and Hoger higher up the field. In defense, Arsenal set up in a 4-4-1-1 with Walcott and Podolski picking up Fuchs and Hoger. Everything seemed to be going right for the Gunners. Their more defensive shape prevented Schalke from doing what they do best- counter attack. When they won possession back they looked to find Cazorla in pockets of space in front of the center backs where he could turn and start counterattacks. Walcott and Podolski tried use their pace to advanced past Fuchs and Hoger down the channels, leaving the Schalke center backs scrambling to defend the width of the pitch. Arsenal didn't get many opportunities to counter but their defensive shape was forcing Schalke to play the ball horizontally in midfield and the German side didn't look particularly threatening.

Schalke's opener in first half stoppage time was such a blow because it came at a time when Arsenal were defending rather comfortably and on a move in which it appeared they were set to execute their plan and launch a counter through Cazorla. Arteta won the ball off Schalke at his own 18 and found Cazorla in space between the Schalke midfield and center backs. The Spaniard lost his footing however (he did several times throughout the night) and Schalke recovered the ball with the Arsenal defense out of shape. Holtby received a waist high pass at the edge of the 18 that he laid down brilliantly for Huntelaar to tuck home. Defending a one goal lead was never going to be an easy task for Arsenal in the second half.

Second Half
Schalke were very adventurous with the positioning of their outside backs to start the second half. Podolski and Walcott continued to drop in deep but Fuchs and Hoger would still at times advance past them. Afellay and Farfan were dangerous when they got on the ball and cut inside, creating room for overlapping runs from the outside backs. Schalke's equalizer came when Walcott had drifted infield to help defend the middle of the park. The ball went wide to an unmarked Fuchs. Sagna felt the need to close him down quickly (maybe not the best option as Fuchs was still 45 yards from goal), leaving empty space down the left channel for Afellay to run into. Mertesacker elected not to leave his position in the box and instead allowed Afellay to pick his head up and fire a cross into the box. It found Hotby who headed it into the path of Farfan for the goal. Once again defending the channels had proved Arsenal's undoing.

After the equalizer both sides seemed content with the draw and the final 20 minutes were fairly uneventful.

Substitutions
Neither manager used his substitutions to alter the game. Stevens was forced into replacing his right back twice when Uchida and Hoger both went down to injury. Wenger didn't make a change until the 90th minute.

West Brom overload Southampton's left back, win comfortably

Peter Odemwingie kept Southampton firmly rooted to the bottom of the Premier League table with goals either side of halftime in West Brom's 2-0 win.

 Although Steve Clarke's West Brom side has consistently lined up in a 4-2-3-1 this season, he has rotated the four attacking players frequently. Today Shane Long was given the start ahead of Romelu Lukaku at forward, Odemwingie was on the right, Zoltan Gera behind Long in the middle and Graham Dorrans on the left.

Nigel Adkin's Southampton played what could be called either 4-2-3-1 or or 4-2-2-2 with Jay Rodriguez playing as a slightly withdrawn forward to the right of Rickie Lambert. Both Adam Lallana and Gaston Ramirez played fairly high up the pitch in their wide positions and both tended to float towards the middle to get on the ball.

West Brom right versus Southampton left
In the first half Adam Lallana stayed very high up the pitch when West Brom were in possession and did a poor job of tracking West Brom's Billy Jones when got forward to join the attack from his right back position. This left Danny Fox constantly overloaded at left back where he was forced to try to defend both Jones and Odemwingie. With one of the two always unmarked, Odemwingie and Jones were able to get the ball in dangerous attacking areas down the right. It was therefore unsurprising when Odemwingie's opener came from a move on the right. This time it was Youssuf Mulumbu who advanced to the right wing from his holding midfield position to overload Fox. Odemwingie drifted inside and received Mulumbu's pass with the time and space to get the ball out of his feet and shoot. His effort took a fortunate deflection on its way to beating Paulo Gazzaniga in the Southampton goal but the Saints could only blame themselves for giving Fox so little help.

Southampton's outside backs push forward
With both Lallana and Ramirez tucking inside from their wide midfield position, Fox and Nathaniel Clyne were encouraged to get forward to provide width from their outside back positions. The pair played especially high in the second half with Southampton chasing the game. This left plenty of space in behind them on the flanks for West Brom to counter into. The hosts were happy to sit deeper and invite the Southampton outside backs forward and then counter with long balls to the flanks for Shane Long when they won possession. Odemwingie's second goal came when Southampton gave the ball away cheaply in the attacking third after Clyne had once again advanced high up the field to help the attack. Long made a run to the space left vacated by Clyne and received a pass on the left wing. Jose Fonte was forced wide from his center back position to pick up Long, leaving Maya Yoshida as the only defender in the penalty area. Odemwingie and Gera both made fine bursting runs into the box and Long picked out Odemwingie with an inch perfect cross.

Southampton struggle for vertical threat
Throughout the second half West Brom were happy to sit deep and allow Southampton to have possession around the halfway line. Southampton circulated the ball well enough in this area but rarely were able to find a penetrating ball into the final third. The Saints out passed West Brom 414 to 300 yet they completed 14 fewer passes in the final third. Nigel Adkin's side simply didn't have the creativity and quality to create meaningful goal scoring opportunities against a crowded defense. Possession and sideways passing are fine but eventually the ball needs to get in the box, particularly when Rickie Lambert is your forward. Lambert is a classic big and strong British no. 9 and needs to get the ball in the penalty area where he can poach to be effective. He isn't nearly as effective when forced to drop into the midfield or drift wide to get on the ball (like more technically gifted forwards like Suarez and Van Persie). Yet he was rarely able to receive passes anywhere near the goal this evening. The graphic below shows where he received passes. Far too often he was forced to collect the ball deep or wide in the left channel.

Conclusion
West Brom once again did an excellent job of advancing the ball quickly on the break with meaningful forward passes. They have been outpossessed in 9 of their 10 Premier League games this season yet their organization and ability to play on the counter has made them a very difficult team to beat.

Things are looking increasingly bleak for Adkins and Southampton. They simply don't have the firepower going forward to get into shootouts with Premier League opposition. If they don't improve their dreadful defensive organization the slim hope they have of survival will be killed off by the new year. They're averaging 2.8 goals against per game and are on pace to concede an incredible 106 goals this campaign. Since the 2002-2003 season, the league's worst defensive team has avoided relegation only once- Bolton in 2006-2007. The ease with which West Brom overloaded their outside back made the seem naive and suggests Adkins and Southampton are out of their league.

Defensive discipline on Arsenal's left will be key against United

In the opening stages of Manchester United's 3-2 league win over Chelsea, Alex Ferguson's side was able to get the ball in dangerous areas down the right side of the pitch. Both of their early goals came from moves down the right: the first a swift counterattacking move after Chelsea had conceded possession in midfield, the second when Rafael and Antonio Valencia combined down the flank, creating space for a Valencia cross into Robin Van Persie.

I wrote on Tuesday of how United's success in the games early stages owed much to Ferguson's decision to play a 4-4-1-1 with Valencia operating wide as a classic right winger. Chelsea's outside backs like to get forward and join in the attack. When they lose possession Ashley Cole and Branislav Ivanovic are often high up the pitch, leaving them vulnerable to counters down the flanks. It was Rooney rather than Valencia who had drifted to the right to spring the counter on United's first goal but it resulted because Cole had gone forward to join in the Chelsea attack.

Chelsea are also vulnerable when the opposition outside backs get involved in the attack. Neither of Chelsea's wider attacking players in Juan Mata or Eden Hazard are quick to help in the defensive end. When the opposition outside backs advance past them, it often leaves Chelsea's own outside backs left to defend two men, particularly when the opposition is playing with a winger. On United's second goal, Hazard was guilty of allowing United right back Rafael to advance past him and receive the ball, leaving Cole to try to defend both Rafael and Valencia. Cole was forced to step to ball, allowing Rafeal to play an easy pass down the line for Valencia who had the time to pick out a perfect low cross for Van Persie.

Like Chelsea, Arsenal line up in a 4-2-3-1 and have in recent weeks been susceptible to opposition attacks from wide areas, particularly down Arsenal's left side. Since the injury to left back Kieran Gibbs, his replacement Andre Santos has been poor both positionally and when asked to defend in 1 v. 1 situations. Ferguson will have certainly taken notice of how Schalke ripped apart the left side of Arsenal's defense in their 2-0 Champions league win over the Gunners last Wednesday and may well choose to once again play with a traditional right winger to exploit this weakness. Opting for Valencia once again seems like a good choice. The Columbian is an excellent option on the wing against teams that play with very attacking full backs. He is defensively disciplined and has a tremendous work rate. He will diligently track the opposition full back on defense but his work rate also allows him to break past the full back into space when United win possession back and look to counter. Alternatively, given Santos' poor 1-on-1 defending, Ferguson could go with the out-of-favor Nani. Nani is less disciplined defensively but brings to the side an ability to beat the opposition off the dribble.

Regardless of which option Ferguson goes with, it will be crucial Arsenal show more defensive discipline on the left than they did against Schalke. Time and again the German side was able to get the ball to right midfielder Jefferson Farfan and right back Atsuto Uchida in far too much space on the wing. While Santos' positioning was poor, he was given little help by left midfielder Lukas Podolski in front of him who frequently allowed Uchida to make unmarked runs down the sideline, forcing Santos to leave Farfan and step to ball. The video below from the first half shows a clear example of this at 4:06. In this passage of play Podolski had drifted to the middle and was lazily half-pressing the Schalke center backs. Cazorla had slid left to fill Podolski's position. Santos had followed Farfan as he drifted towards the middle, opening up space down the right sideline. Cazorla completely switches off on Uchida, allowing the right back to make the run into space unmarked. Huntelaar's finishing was poor on this occasion but the video highlights what was a recurring problem for the Gunners. Understanding and communication between Santos and whoever is defending ahead of him on the left (most often Podolski) will be massively important for Arsenal against United. United's outside backs will get forward and they proved against Chelsea they can punish the opposition when given the chance to stretch its outside backs.

 

Ferguson may also look to frequently switch the point of attack from left to right with long diagonal balls to the right wing (perhaps we could see Paul Scholes in the side for his long passing ability). Switching the point of attack will force Santos into situations where he's left to defend the right winger 1-on-1, a battle Valencia (or Nani) are always likely to win. Santos will need to be more up for the task than he was against Schalke.

Both limiting the number of chances United have to counter and effectively dealing with the counter when United do get the chance to break will be the final key factor for Arsenal. To prevent the counter they obviously need to be diligent in possession, avoiding silly giveaways in the middle third of the field (Schalke's second goal came from a poor giveaway from Serge Gnabry in midfield). But United will inevitably get the chance to break and when they do its crucial Arsenal get their defensive transition right. Like Chelsea's outside backs, both Carl Jenkinson and Santos are called upon to join the attack and provide width high up the field. This of course leaves them exposed to counter attacks down the wings when they lose possession. However, unlike John Obi Mikel and Ramires at Chelsea, Arsenal won't have especially combative, ball winning holding midfielders in front of the back four to break up counterattacks (unless Wenger makes a surprising decision and starts Coquelin alongside Arteta). The center backs and holding midfielders will therefore have to be particularly aware of their defensive shape even when Arsenal are in possession.

With the Gunners in the midst of a rather unconvincing four game spell, they'll need to improve drastically on recent performances to have any shot of coming away from Old Trafford with a result. Shoring up the left side of the defense and preventing United's wide men from getting crosses into Van Persie will be crucial in ensuring the Gunners don't experience a repeat of last season's humiliating 8-2 defeat.

Most used formations in Europe chart

Here's a really fascinating graphic from whoscored.com of the most used formations in Europe's top 5 leagues. Interesting that although 4-2-3-1 is the most used formation in Spain, England, Germany and France, it's only the 11th most used formation in Italy where it has been used only four times. Given Italy's history of catenacio it's unsurprising three man defenses are far more popular there than anywhere else in Europe. Of course, some of the formations are so similar in practice it renders the notations all but meainingless- I'm guessing it's pretty difficult for anyone to distinguish between a 3-5-2, a 3-5-1-1 and a 5-3-2. Nonetheless this is a fun little chart and certainly highlights how fashionable 4-2-3-1 is at the moment.

Ferguson's reactive tactics exploit defensive weaknesses of Chelsea's 4-2-3-1; could do the same to Arsenal

After Manchester United's relatively successful experimentation with a narrow diamond midfield this season (see Michael Cox analysis of their 3-0 win over Newcastle), Sir Alex Ferguson opted for his more traditional 4-4-1-1 shape against Chelsea with two true wide players in Ashley Young and Antonio Valencia.

His decision to go with width against Chelsea wasn't a particularly difficult one. Ferguson knew full well that his counterpart Roberto Di Matteo would go with the 4-2-3-1 system- with Oscar, Juan Mata and Eden Hazard forming the attacking midfield three- that Chelsea had enjoyed success using in the league this season. Since Chelsea used the formation for the first time in a 2-2 Champions League draw against Juventus, they have employed the same attacking midfield three behind Torres in every Premier League game. Ferguson had plenty of chances to scout the formation and would have had little difficulty recognizing its weaknesses.

Chelsea's 4-2-3-1 formation has two main weakness. The first weakness is its vulnerability to counter attacks (particularly down the flanks). When Ashley Cole and Branislav Ivanovic push forward to help the attack, space opens up in wide areas for the opposition to quickly move into on the break. The second weakness is its tendency to leave Cole and Ivanovic without cover in wide defensive areas. Neither Mata nor Hazard are especially keen defenders. Hazard is particularly guilty of failing to offer defensive cover to his outside backs. Against teams that play with narrower midfields this isn't always a huge problem because John Obi Mikel and Ramires provide cover for the back four in the center of the pitch in their deep lying midfield positions. However, against teams with wingers the problem becomes more apparent. With Mata and Hazard staying high up the pitch, space often opens up for opposition outside backs to advance past them unchecked. When the opposition outside back receives the ball, it leaves Chelsea's own outside back overloaded and forces him to try to defend two players. He's forced to step to ball, leaving the winger unmarked with the time and space to receive the ball and play dangerous crosses into the box.

That United's two early goals came from exploiting these two Chelsea weaknesses suggests Ferguson got his tactics about right. The first goal came when United were able to nick possession in midfield and counter quickly down the right. The second came when United right back Rafael was able to receive the ball behind Hazard, creating a 2 v. 1 advantage with Valencia down the right wing for United. Cole was forced to leave Valencia unmarked and step to Rafael. The Brazilian played a simple ball wide to Valencia who had the time to pick out Van Persie's run in the box (I unfortunately can't embed the video but you can watch the goal on YouTube here). Had Hazard been more diligent in his defensive responsibilities, Rafael would have never received the ball as high up the pitch as he did.

It should be interesting to see how United line up against Arsenal this weekend. Like Chelsea, the Gunners have almost exclusively played a 4-2-3-1 this season and therefore face some of the same defensive problems as Chelsea (although Lucas Podolski and Aaron Ramsey seem to do a slightly better job of protecting their outside backs than Mata and Hazard). Will Ferguson once again opt for a 4-4-1-1 and try to exploit space on the wings? Since Arsenal have been forced to play Andre Santos at left back for the injured Kieran Gibbs, they have looked very vulnerable to attacks down the opponent's right side. It would be surprising if Ferguson didn't again opt for a right winger to exploit the shaky Santos.

Chelsea's and Arsenal's continued use of a 4-2-3-1 indicates the players are comfortable in that system and with each game they play in that system they'll continue to develop a better understanding of one another and become more fluid. However, it also makes them predictable for clever, adaptable managers like Ferguson who are happy to play reactive football. The Scotsman is comfortable playing any number of different formations and styles based on the strengths and weaknesses of his opponent. More often than not, when he knows how the opposition is going to set out to play, he can implement a strategy that gives United a very good chance of winning games. I'm not suggesting Arsenal and Chelsea should alter their formations from time to time in the same manner as Ferguson. Playing Ferguson's more reactive style has its own draw backs, mainly that by adapting your formation to your opponent you aren't able to develop a fluid, consistent system of your own and sometimes even managers with the pedigree of SAF simply get the tactics wrong. United's 1-0 defeat to City at the end of last season that effectively handed the league title over to City is a good example. Ferguson set out with Park Ji Sung as the most advanced midfielder behind Rooney in a 4-5-1 in a set up designed to attack on the counter. Park was forced to track Yaya Toure's runs forward, leaving Rooney isolated up top. United rarely threatened after going a goal behind. However, more reactive managers do have the distinct advantage of arranging their teams to mitigate the most dangerous elements of an opponents system and exploit the weakest ones.

It should also be mentioned that Ferguson's tactics against Chelsea were hardly flawless. After going up 2-0, Chelsea were much the better side until being reduced to 10 (then 9) men. During this stretch of the game Chelsea out passed United 220 to 156 and United were continually troubled by Chelsea's numerical superiority in the center of midfield. Perhaps Ferguson would have been wise to replace Young with someone like Anderson who would have allowed United to better compete in the center of midfield after going up by two goals.

Five observations from Arsenal 1-0 QPR

Update: I added another observation so it's now five observations rather than four.

Coming into Arsenal’s London derby with Queens Park Rangers, Arsenal had suffered a league loss to a then winless Norwich City followed by a defeat to Champions League foe Schalke 04 at the Emirates — the club’s first home loss in the group stage of that competition in 9 years. Arsenal’s 1-0 victory at the Emirates over a winless, 10-man QPR side that currently sits at the bottom of the Premier League table was hardly the emphatic victory that Arsène Wenger needed to quell the frustrations of Arsenal supporters. Arsenal’s lone goal came from a Mikel Arteta tap-in after the ball bounced around QPR’s goalmouth. Replays indicate that Arteta was unambiguously in an offside position; Mark Hughes and Queens Park Rangers are rightfully upset with the decision.

(1) Arsenal continue to struggle to create scoring chances. The Gunners had 12 shots 5 of which were on target in the first 70 minutes of the game, but few of these attempts were genuine scoring chances. Other than a Ramsey header off the woodwork from a Bacary Sagna cross inside of 10 minutes and a Per Mertesacker header from an Arteta free kick at the beginning of the second half, Arsenal seldom created scoring opportunities until the final 20 minutes of the game.

(2) Arsenal created several scoring chances in the final period of the game, but they did not take their chances. Wenger brought on Walcott for Wilshere in the 67th minute, Gervinho for Podolski in the 71st minute, and Arshavin for Gervinho in the 82nd minute after a Gervinho injury. The insertions of Walcott and Gervinho/Arshavin gave Arsenal more width and seemed to give impetus to the attack. In the 76th minute, the ball bounced out to a wide open Santi Cazorla a mere 15 yards from goal, but Cazorla — probably Arsenal’s most competent finisher with his feet — skyed his shot far over the goal. Soon after, Thomas Vermaelen fouled Stéphane Mbia who then kicked at Vermaelen from ground. Anthony Taylor’s decision to show a straight red card was uncontroversial. With their width and a man advantage, Arsenal managed 8 shots, 4 of which were on target, from the 80th minute onwards. Despite several good chances, Arsenal’s only goal came from an offside Mikel Arteta. Prior to Arteta’s involvement in the play, Olivier Giroud couldn't head a pinpoint perfect cross from Andrey Arshavin past Júlio César who made a number of fine saves in the final period.

(3) Arsenal were fortunate to close out the final minutes of the game after Arteta's winner in the 84th minute. Even with a man advantage and only 6 minutes remaining in regulation time, Arsenal allowed QPR two promising scoring chances: Esteban Granero was in on goal in the 89th but pulled his shot wide, and Jamie Mackey had an even better opportunity in extra time that Vito Mannone did well to block. With such little time remaining, a man advantage, and a squad that prides itself on its ability to play a possession-based system, Wenger is likely furious that his side nearly dropped points from this fixture.

(4) Jack Wilshere was impressive in his return to Arsenal’s lineup. Wilshere, who had not made a Premier League appearance since May of 2011 after a prolonged recovery from injury, rarely put a foot wrong in the 66 minutes he played. He impressively completed 44 of 47 total passes (94 percent) and 21 of 22 passes in the attacking third (95 percent), he successfully completed 4 out of 5 take-ons, he created one chance, and he had a shot on target.

(5) It is unclear if Wilshere and Arteta have the complementary skill sets necessary to form an effective midfield partnership. Wilshere was an essential component of the Arsenal midfield in the 2010-11 season, and Arteta served a similar role in the midfield in the 2011-12 season. QPR’s visit to the Emirates marked the first instance in which the two have played in Arsenal’s midfield together. During the game, Wilshere and Arteta almost ran into each other on a couple of occasions. At times, Wilshere seemed to sit beside Arteta in a deeper midfield role rather than play a box-to-box role. Looking at the figure below that displays Wilshere’s passing, it is evident that he sprinkled passes from side to side. Arteta’s passing often serves a similar purpose (see, for example, his passing vs. West Ham). Arsenal have arguably looked most dangerous this season with Arteta and Abou Diaby in the lineup. Diaby’s style of play is generally more vertical, and his driving runs help link up the midfield with the attacking players. It would, of course, be rash to pass judgment on a midfield partnership that has existed for all of 67 minutes. I suspect as they play together more and as Wilshere improves his fitness levels, their partnership will improve. But, given the myriad of options in the midfield that Wenger has at his disposal, especially as players like Diaby and Tomáš Rosický return from injury, Wenger will need to seriously consider the most effective combination of midfielders rather than the best individual midfielders available for selection.

Premier League Net Passing 2012-2013

In February, Dan wrote two excellent pieces explaining the net passing statistic and how the relationship between net passing and goal difference for an individual team can shine light on the importance that team places on dominating possession (we prefer using the net passing metric over possession percentage because it is more fine grained). Net passing is simply the number of passes a team completes over the course of a game less the number their opponent completes. If team B completes more passes in a game than than team A, team A's net passing for the game is negative.

For teams whose tactics are largely centered around ball retention and patient buildup play we expect a strong positive relationship between net passing and goal difference. In other words, as net passing increases for these teams we would expect to see goal difference increase positively.

For teams who prefer to play primarily on the counter, outpossessing the opponent is unimportant. Counterattacking teams want their opponent to have possession and to commit numbers forward so they can break quickly while the opposition is out of position. Counterattacks require fewer passes than slow buildup play from the back. Therefore, for primarily counterattacking teams, we expect no discernible relationship between net passing and goal difference.

Of course, many top level sides use both counterattacking and possession styles based on factors like the style of play of the opposition and whether the game is played at a club's home stadium or an away ground. For instance, we'd expect Manchester United to boss possession in a league game against Stoke at Old Trafford and have a positive net passing value (which they did last Saturday). However, in a Champions League game against Barcelona at the Nou Camp, we'd expect them to keep a compact defensive shape, allow Barca to have the bulk of possession and then look to quickly counter and therefore have a negative net passing value. For these sides, we'd expect a weaker relationship between net passing and goal difference.

Premier League Net Passing 2012-2013
The bar chart below shows the average net passing for each of the Premier League's 20 teams after eight games (Reading and Sunderland have played only seven games). Teams are listed from left to right according to their position in the league table (Chelsea currently sit atop the table while QPR are last). Manchester City, a side with very technical players capable of short intricate passes, have the highest net passing value. They are outpassing their opponents by an average of 231 passes per game. Stoke City, a team that focuses more on physical strength and territory than possession, have the lowest net passing value. They are being outpassed by an average of 226 passes per game.

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I'm also including this graph of passes completed per game for anyone interested.

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Net Passing and League Standing Relationship
While Dan looked at the relationship between net passing and points per game for individual teams, I wanted to look at the relationship between net passing and league standing for all 20 Premier League teams to determine the explanatory power of net passing on league position. If we believed that net passing was the only factor that determined whether a team won or lost a game, we'd expect the team with the highest net passing value to be in first place in the league and the team with the lowest net passing value to be in last. The bars in the net passing bar graph above would get progressively shorter as we moved right from the first place team to the last.

Clearly this is not the case. Manchester City have the highest net passing value yet they are only third in the league. QPR have a positive net passing value but are in last place. Liverpool have the fourth highest net passing value in the league but are still in the bottom half of the table while West Brom and West Ham are 6th and 7th respectively despite having substantial negative net passing values.

The graph shows what we're all well aware of- there are more factors that determine the winner of a soccer game than simply who passes the ball more. For example, in Manchester United's two defeats this season to Everton and Tottenham they outpassed their rivals by 818 passes. Arsenal completed 414 more passes than Norwich last Saturday but were beaten 1-0. Teams have to convert possession into goal scoring opportunities and then have to finish those opportunities. For a number of reasons, it often makes sense for certain teams to employ tactics that aren't focused on ball retention and allow the opposition to control the bulk of possession- it doesn't necessarily mean these teams will finish in the bottom of the league because they have a low net passing value.

The bar graph is interesting however in that it shows of the ten teams that have positive net passing values, seven of them are in the top half of the table. Of the ten with negative net passing values, seven are in the bottom half of the table. That there are more teams with positive net passing values in the top half of the league suggests there may be a relationship between net passing and league position.

To determine exactly what the explanatory power of net passing on league position is, I plotted league position versus net passing for each of the 20 Premier League teams below. Teams higher up on the y axis are in the bottom half of the league standings and teams further to the left on the x axis have higher negative net passing values. If we believe that higher net passing values improve a team's league standing, we'd expect our trend line to slope down and to the right (indicating that as net passing increases, league position gets closer to first place). Indeed, the trend line is negative. The r^2 value of 0.229 tells us that net passing explains about 23% of the variation in league standing. So although net passing clearly isn't the only factor that determines the winner of a game, it does seem to play a part in determining league position.

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The negative slope makes sense. Controlling possession and outpassing your opponent requires a team to have players that are technically gifted (good control and passing ability). Having a lot of technically gifted players also makes a team more likely to win games. Manchester United will always boss possession against a team like Stoke because their players are more technically talented and more often than not they'll beat Stoke because they have superior talent. Because of the superior talent required to play a possession game, it makes sense that top teams also generally have high net passing values.

The analysis however does not determine the subtle difference of whether top teams are top teams because they dominate passing or whether they dominate passing because they are top teams (for a team like Arsenal with a strong emphasis on ball retention regardless of the opponent my guess is the former, for a more tactically more flexible team like Manchester United I'd guess the latter).

Sample Size Issues
The significance of this analysis is limited by the small number of games played in the Premier League thus far. Eighteen teams have played only eight games and two have played only seven. Teams have also not played the same schedules as one another which will also influence net passing and league position. For example, West Ham has only played three games against teams currently in the top half of the table (and lost two) while seven of QPR's eight games have been against teams in the top half. Would QPR and West Ham's net passing and league position look different if their schedules had been swapped? More than likely they would. It would be interesting to do this analysis for the whole of last season. A project for the future perhaps.

Fluid Chelsea attack has inevitably left them vulnerable to counterattacks

Shakhtar Donetsk threatened Chelsea with swift counterattacks all evening as the Ukranian side dominated play in a 2-1 Champions League win. The win puts the Ukrainian side 3 points clear of Chelsea at the top of group E and puts a great deal of pressure on the Blues to win the return home fixture in a fortnight if they're to qualify for the knockout stages.

Both teams lined up in 4-2-3-1 formations. Frank Lampard was given the start alongside John Obi Mikel as a deep lying midfielder. Ramires shuffled to the right attacking midfield position, presumably to provide defensive help to Branislav Ivanovic on the excellent Willain, while Eden Hazard started the game on the bench. There were no surprises in Mircea Lucescu's starting 11.

Lampard picked up an injury 18 minutes in and was replaced by Hazard. Ramires dropped back to Lampard's position in the center of midfield and Hazard played on the right, the lineup Chelsea have used most of this season.

For the second consecutive game Chelsea were vulnerable on the counter. While Chelsea were fortunate that Moussa Dembele and Gareth Bale were out of Spurs' lineup in their 4-2 win at the weekend, they still at times appeared susceptible to quick counters when they lost possession in what was a rather open game. The problem was even more pronounced last night as Willian, Alex Teixeira and Henrik Mkhitaryan were able to get in space behind Mikel, Ramires and outside backs Ivanovic and Cole on the break and run at the center backs.

The space that opens up between Chelsea's two holding midfielders and center backs has been an issue all season. When Mikel is forced to push into a more advanced position to offer a passing option for the front four, the center backs have stayed rather deep creating a big pocket of empty space. When Chelsea lose possession, the opposition has been able to play quick outlet passes to teammates moving into that space, setting off dangerous counters. As they showed last season under Villas-Boas, Chelsea are not comfortable squeezing the space the opposition has to play in when possession is lost by pushing the defensive line forward and pressing (like Barcelona). Instead, their defense tends to drop deeper when they lose the ball.

This is understandable. John Terry's lack of pace makes him vulnerable to balls in behind him when he presses forward and Chelsea's experimentation with a high line last season was disastrous (the 5-3 Arsenal loss the clearest example). But because Mata, Hazard and Oscar are typically not quick to make defensive recovery runs, loads of space opens up in the middle third of the pitch for their opponents to move into- this explains why Chelsea's last two games have been so open. The issue is, effectively, that the back six and front four have been rather disjointed defensively. While this shape has given Chelsea's three advanced midfielders the freedom to focus more on creating scoring opportunities than worrying about defensive responsibilities, it has made them a less compact side defensively.

The new, more fluid attacking system has produced some breathtaking displays thus far and few Chelsea supporters will be calling for a return to the defensive tactics that won them the Champions League last season. However, they'll likely continue to look vulnerable on the break as they adjust to the new system.

Preview: Chelsea vs. Tottenham

Andre Villas-Boas and Roberto Di Matteo will lead their respective clubs out to a lunchtime kickoff at White Hart Lane tomorrow. There are plenty of sub plots in this one. Villas-Boas was of course sacked by Chelsea in March, paving the way for Di Matteo to lead the club to a historic FA Cup-Champions League double. That Champions League title sent Spurs crashing out of a qualification spot for this season's installment of the tournament despite finishing fourth in the league- two places above Chelsea. In April, Chelsea handily beat Spurs 5-1 in an FA Cup semifinal. However, Spurs contend a wrongfully allowed Juan Mata goal that made the score 3-1 was the turning point in that contest. Perhaps most importantly, this game showcases the Premier League's two most sartorially inclined managers in a battle over the better wearer of impeccably tailored suits.

Both sides are playing decent soccer at the moment. After a rocky opening three games to the season, Spurs have won four straight including the club's first away win at Old Trafford since 1989. A 0-0 draw at QPR is the only blemish on Chelsea's record as they sit four points clear at the top of the Premier League table.

Same Formation, Different Styles
Both sides are likely to line up in 4-2-3-1 formations though the different attributes of the two teams' sets of players mean they'll play it with very different styles. Chelsea's three attacking midfielders, Oscar, Hazard and Mata, are clever and technically gifted players who look to get in pockets of space between the seams and play intricate passing combinations with one another. Mata and Hazard will frequently switch sides and both will drift in field and occupy more central areas. Chelsea will likely look to attack patiently and use their tight control and quick passing to create gaps to get the ball in behind the Tottenham defense. Expect Ramires to play over Lampard to give Chelsea more athleticism in the middle of the park to match the athleticism of Sandro and Dembele.

Spurs attacking midfield three doesn't have the same technical quality as that of their counterparts but they have incredible pace and athleticism. Lennon and Bale will look to get the ball wide into the channels and get behind Chelsea's outside backs. Dempsey isn't a typical center attacking midfielder that links defense to offense- he doesn't have that type of passing vision- however Spurs will mainly transition from defense to offense through either Lennon and Bale or through Dembele's powerful runs forward from a deeper position. Dempsey's ability to make well timed runs and finish off chances will make him a threat for balls into the box from Lennon and Bale.

Tottenham wingers vs. Chelsea outside backs
Two of the most important individual battles will be fought in wide areas between Chelsea's outside backs and Tottenham's wingers. The contest between Ivanovic and Bale will pose a particularly difficult tactical question for Di Matteo, specifically how brave he wants Ivanovic to be with his positioning going forward. With Mata and Hazard frequently tucking inside higher up the pitch, Chelsea like to get width from their outside backs in the attacking end of the field. However, when Ivanovic pushes forward it will be open space for Spurs to counter into with Bale. The last thing Chelsea want is Bale running at full pace at their center backs. His goal against Manchester United (at 0:25 in the video below) shows just how dangerous he is when he's able to get the ball behind the opposition right back (Rafael on that day) and run with a head of steam at center backs. Lennon's pace could also be dangerous on the right, though Ashley Cole is quicker and a better defender than Ivanovic so should be more equipped to deal with Lennon's bursts forward.

If Lennon and Bale are able to get in behind the Chelsea outside backs, Chelsea's ball side center back will have to rotate wide to step to ball, leaving Defoe in a 1 v. 1 situation with the other center back. Dempsey's runs into the box from midfield will provide more of an aerial threat on crosses while Dembele's late runs to the edge of the area can create dangerous shooting chances, as was seen in his goal against Norwich. 

Chelsea's Tempo
Chelsea will likely hope to control the tempo of this game and keep it played at a relatively slow pace. Spurs are far more athletic and powerful than they are creative and therefore a more open game will suit them better than it will Chelsea. Expect Chelsea to keep things compact at the back, defending fairly deep with two banks of four. With the likes of Dembele, Lennon, Bale, Dempsey and Defoe, Tottenham are far more dangerous when they have the space to turn and run at defenders than when they have to circulate the ball quickly with passes to unlock crowded defenses. Against a tight defense, Tottenham don't have the type of players that are as clever with their movement and creative with their passes as Chelsea. Given this is an away game for Chelsea, they'll be particularly keen not to allow this one to open up and rile up Spurs fans.

Conclusion
This game will largely come down to which team can impose its style on the game early. If Spurs can turn this into an open game, their pacey attackers and athleticism will give them the advantage. If Chelsea can control the tempo and allow their four most advanced players to use their clever movement and superior technique going forward, they'll have the advantage.

Serbia must face international ban

Shortly after the melee that ensued after the final whistle of England's 1-0 European Championship win over Serbia, video surfaced on YouTube of Serbian supporters audibly directing monkey chants towards England's Danny Rose (below). Rose, understandably, reacted angrily to the racist chants and kicked a ball into the crowd, an action that would earn him a second yellow. He has since said that the racist chanting had gone on all game and that he was twice hit by stones thrown from the Krusevac crowd, claims captain Jordan Henderson has since confirmed.

The behavior from the Serbian supporters was disgraceful but hardly surprising for a nation with a well documented history of racially motivated taunts and violent behavior at football matches. In 2003 Serbian ultras directed racial abuse at black Wales players. In 2007 black England U-21 international Nedum Onuoha was the victim of racist chanting. In a Euro 2012 qualifier in Genoa last year, the referee was forced to abandon the game after Serbian ultras clashed with police and threw flares on the field. All of these incidents were met with farcically weak punishments from UEFA. At best the Serbian FA has shown an inability to deal with racism and crowd violence. At worst, they've shown an unwillingness to do so. Their behavior in the aftermath of yesterday's incident suggests the latter.

Despite the clear video evidence proving the contrary, the Serbian FA released a statement saying there were no instances of racism throughout the match and that in fact Rose was to blame for the fracas that broke out after the final whistle.

The Serbian FA statement said,

"FA of Serbia absolutely refuses and denies that there were any occurrences of racism before and during the match at the stadium in Kruševac. Making connection between the seen incident - a fight between members of the two teams - and racism has absolutely no ground and we consider it to be a total malevolence."

With regards to Rose the statement said,

"Unfortunately, after the fourth minute of the additional time and the victory goal scored by the guest team, unpleasant scenes were seen at the pitch. And while most of the English team players celebrated the score, their player number 3, Danny Rose, behaved in inappropriate, unsportsmanlike and vulgar manner towards the supporters on the stands at the stadium in Kruševac, and for that he was shown a red card. Unfortunately, it would turn out that was the moment the incident, that later developed, had started."

This official statement from the Serbian FA casts at least as big a shadow on Serbian football as the behavior of its fans in Krusevac. Rose was guilty of nothing more than representing his country as a black person. For the Serbian FA to deny the claims of racial abuse when evidence proves it happened and to somehow blame the victim of that abuse for the violent scenes is disgraceful. It shows they have no interest in cleaning up their act and that their FA is in fact complicit in the unsavory fan behavior. By denying there was any racism shown Tuesday evening, their FA is effectively saying to Serbian fans, "do what you please, we'll deny any claims against you rather than try to stop your behavior."

UEFA has to ban Serbia from all international competition for an extended period of time. The safety of black players should be the main focus of UEFA when they look into this incident. How can UEFA conscionably send a black footballer to play in an environment that clearly isn't a safe one for him? As long as Serbia continues to create an intimidating environment inside their stadiums, and continues to make no effort to change, they don't deserve the right to play in any international tournaments at any level.

UEFA president Michel Platini warned Serbia in February of last year that if they didn't control their fans they'd face expulsion from future club and international tournaments. Serbia has clearly failed on that front. If Platini fails to follow through on his warning, FIFA and UEFA will lose the tiny amount of credibility they have left.

While condemnation of the Serbian supporters' behavior has been nearly universal, a few folks in the British media were displeased with Rose's reaction to the racial abuse. Former professional footballer Paul Parker, himself a victim of racial abuse during his playing days in England, suggested Rose should have kept his dignity, walked down the tunnel and "saved his complaint for the official channels." But what have the official channels, ie UEFA, done to combat the problem of racism? On more than one occasion the behavior of certain Serbian fans has disgraced the sport yet UEFA continues to give them slaps on the wrist as punishment in the form of trivial fines and one match stadium bans. If black players continue to simply walk down the tunnel when they've been racially abused as though nothing has happened, as Parker suggests, the official channels will be all too happy to sweep the incidents under the rug and move on as though nothing did in fact happen. Roses's reaction raised the profile of this event around the world. People are demanding UEFA, for once, react strongly to the disreputable and dangerous behavior of Serbian fans. Contrary to what Parker suggests, Rose acted with an incredible amount of dignity- he stood up to intolerant, unacceptable behavior despite the threat of violence from Serbian players and fans. It's time for UEFA to do the same.

Thoughts and recap: France 1-1 Spain

This was a game of two halves with Spain controlling the first with patient buildup play and France dominating the second on the counter.

France defended very deep in the first half with a bank of five in midfield in front of the back four. Only Benzema stayed behind the ball. The deep defensive line allowed Spain's midfield to comfortably dictate the tempo of the game. Very little pressure was put on Xavi and Xabi Alonso in deeper areas. Fabregas, Cazorla and Iniesta all looked to get in space between France's midfield and back four and combined for some tidy interchanges in these areas. Spain caused France the most trouble when they were able to get in between the seams, turn and face the back four, and slide balls in behind the back four.

France should have taken a lesson from Portugal manager Paulo Bento's excellent tactical set up against Spain in the Euros. Bento played his midfielders higher up the pitch and pressed Xabi Alonso and Xavi when they got in possession around the midfield line. This broke up Spain's rhythm and halted service into their more advanced playmakers. The plan was to win possession back higher up the field and then quickly counter through Nani and Ronaldo on the wings. Although Ronaldo missed a decent chance and Portugal never got the goal they needed, the plan frustrated Spain into playing more long passes than they would have liked and the game ultimately ended 0-0.

By playing such a deep line, France gave Spain's deeper lying players the opportunity to pick their heads up and find a penetrating pass forward. Xavi and Xabi Alonso are brilliant passers more than capable of threading a decisive ball through tight areas. France were clearly looking to counter when they did win the ball back. However, with the defense sitting so deep and inviting pressure, when they did win back possession it was in and around their own 18. Spain were able to press immediately, denying France a decent outlet pass and forcing them to launch hopeful long balls for Benzema that Spain were comfortably able to win back. They needed to win the ball back higher up the field to spark quick counters.

 In the second half France finally started pressing the Spanish midfield higher up the pitch, unsettling the rhythm they had been able to establish in the first half. Deschamps replaced Menez and Gonalons with more combative midfielders Moussa Sissoko and Blaise Matuidi. Both were outstanding, continuously nicking possession from Spain in midfield and spring dangerous counter attacks, mainly through Valbuena, Ribery and Benzema. They looked excellent on the counter, creating several dangerous scoring opportunities only to be spoiled by some wasteful finishing. The breakthrough finally came in the last minute of stoppage time when Juanfran inexplicably gave the ball way in midfield, allowing one final France counter forward. Matuidi picked the ball off Juanfran and released Ribery down the left. He crossed in for second half substitute Olivier Giroud who made no mistake, heading in on the last play of the game. France were deservedly rewarded for their adventurous play in the second half.

US continue to struggle to turn possession into goals

Daniel rightfully pointed out that my previous post gave far too much credit to Jurgen Klinsmann for making what any professional soccer coach would have realized was a necessary move away from Bob Bradley's 4-4-2 and introducing three-man central midfield formations. During Bradley's tenure, it became rather obvious his favored 4-4-2 was allowing the opposition too much space in the center of the park- Klinsmann can hardly be considered a brilliant tactician simply for recognizing that fact. While his tactical shifts have created a more solid spine down the center of the field, the US continues to struggle to translate midfield dominance into genuine goal scoring opportunities. A 92nd minute goal from Eddie Johnson against Antigua & Barbuda spared Klinsmann the blushes of what would have been one of the most humiliating defeats in the team's history but signaled the team has to improve quickly if they want to avoid a nervous final phase of qualification.

Some of the US's offensive difficulties can reasonably be blamed on the challenges that accompany playing CONCACAF opposition on the road- playing on dreadful pitches in front of hostile crowds is no easy task (although it would be quite a stretch to say the 8,000 fans that attended Sir Vivian Richards Stadium Friday created an intimidating atmosphere), particularly in torrential weather when the opposition defends with all 10 men in their own defensive third. However, it's still deeply concerning that the US has had such a difficult time converting dominant possession figures into genuine goal scoring opportunities against vastly inferior opposition. Despite holding 72% possession Friday against Antigua & Barbuda, the US could only muster four shots on target. The frightening truth is that the US has not looked good on the road once in this phase of qualifying. In fact, you could reasonably argue the first half of the 1-0 home win over Jamaica was the only decent half we've played thus far.

One good half out of ten played does not bode well for the team in the final hexagonal phase of qualification, assuming the US get a result over Guatemala tonight and qualify. Based on current standings, the hexagonal would consist of Guatemala, USA, Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama and Canada. With the possible exception of Canada, those are all very difficult places to play. Given current form, it doesn't seem inconceivable that the US could struggle to finish in the top three and secure automatic qualification.

How responsible Klinsmann is for the recent run of unconvincing performances is difficult to say. While he can take credit for the fact his controversial roster inclusions of Alan Gordon and Eddie Johnson proved to be a difference maker against A&B, legitimate questions should be raised about how the US put themselves in a position where they needed a last minute winner in the first place. This phase of qualifying was expected to be a cakewalk for the Americans and it probably should have been. That they've left themselves with work still to do in the final game against Guatemala to ensure passage to the next stage suggests the US may not be adjusting to Klinsmann as quickly as had been hoped. We knew from the outset Klinsmann wanted to introduce a patient, possession-based system and has done so. But while his style has certainly allowed the US to dominate possession, too much of that possession occurs in the middle third of the field. As we move the ball into the attacking third we often lack the technical ability and inventiveness required to unlock compact defenses. Throughout the field, the ball moves from player to player too slowly, allowing defenses to easily shift and retain their proper shape. There's a sneaking suspicion that Klinsmann's ambition for how he wants the team to play does not much the technical ability of the players at his disposal. While I applaud his ambition of bringing a more modern brand of football to the USMNT, his job is, first and foremost, to qualify for the World Cup. Qualifiers are not the time to be dogmatic about your ideals, sometimes pragmatism is necessary.

This isn't to say Klinsmann is doomed to fail. The world of international football has its examples of teams that have struggled in the buildup to major tournaments but gone on to achieve great things. Carlos Bilardo won only three of his first 15 games in charge of Argentina and only one of seven in the buildup to the 1986 World Cup. Argentina would go on to win that tournament. The US is obviously less talented than Argentina and no one is expecting them to win the World Cup in Brazil but the point is that Klinsmann will ultimately be judged on how he performs at the World Cup if the US qualify, not on how convincing they were in qualification. Poor performances in qualifiers and friendlies would be quickly forgotten if Klinsmann can get the team into the knockout stages in Brazil. The challenges of playing in a World Cup are very different than those of a CONCACAF qualifying campaign and may actually better suit Klinsmann's style of play. Pitches will certainly be wider than 70 yards so there will be better opportunities to stretch defenses laterally and play with more width. Few if any teams will be frightened enough of the US to defend with nine men in the defensive third so there should be more opportunities to get in dangerous pockets of space in and around the 18 and more opportunities to counter. Opponents will be more talented but will also open themselves up. This should allow the US to rely less on technique and clever passing-which they've been forced to do against compact CONCACAF defenses and isn't the strongest aspect of the American's game- and more on athleticism.

Getting ahead of myself though. Let's get a result tonight first.

Klinsmann's 3-man central midfield has given USMNT defense needed strengthening

The jury still seems to be out on whether the USA are showing enough signs of progress under Jurgen Klinsmann to suggest the 48-year-old German is the man to lead the team to a successful 2014 World Cup run. Historic away wins under Klinsmann over Mexico and Italy hint at a team on the rise, yet a puzzling loss to Jamaica in a World Cup qualifier in July, controversial roster selections and an underwhelming goal-scoring record have raised doubts among some American supporters about his ability to effectively manage the national team.

A number of the concerns surrounding Klinsmann's first year and a half on the job are reasonable. Four losses from his opening six games wasn't the impression he would have expected to make. The US have not packed enough of a punch in front of goal. In Klinsmann's 18 games in charge, they have scored more than one goal only three times and have averaged just 1.17 goals per game. He got his tactics wrong in the 2-1 loss to Jamaica, putting the US in a precarious position in World Cup qualification. We voiced our frustration on this blog about his decision in that game to leave Clint Dempsey high up the field just behind forwards Jozy Altidore and Herculez Gomez, leaving the three man midfield of Kyle Beckerman, Jermaine Jones, and Maurice Edu stretched to cover the width of the pitch against a Jamaica side playing with two wingers. His most recent decision to leave Altidore off the roster for the upcoming qualifiers and his hesitation to select Michael Bradley to the squad early in his reign raised questions about his team selection.

However, despite what many see as a disappointing first 15 months on the job, it's important to consider the type of soccer the national team was playing prior to Klinsmann's arrival and how it has changed since. Under Bob Bradley the US were an undisciplined side tactically, particularly defensively. From January 2010 until he was sacked in July 2011, Bradley's team played nine teams ranked in the top 30 of the FIFA World Rankings. They drew three of those and lost the other six. In those nine games, they conceded an average of 2.2 goals per game. Klinsmann has faced seven sides ranked in the top 30 and won 2, drawn 1 and lost 3. During those games, the US have conceded 1.2 goals per game, a full goal improvement over Bradley. The US are nowhere close to being able to match the technique of Europe and South America's best sides. In order for the US to compete with them they need to be organized and have great defensive shape.  Klinsmann's biggest contribution the national team thus far has been to improve that defensive shape by introducing more modern formations, specifically formations that use a three-man central midfield and provide more adequate cover for the back four.

Bradley's default formation was either a traditional 4-4-2 (I use traditional to mean a 4-4-2 with two center midfielders and two wide midfielders) or a 4-4-1-1 with a withdrawn forward behind a #9 striker. Both of these systems use only two center midfielders, and typically Bradley would play one of either Maurice Edu, Ricardo Clark, or Jose Torres alongside his son Michael. Played well, 4-4-1-1s and 4-4-2s can be fine formations, and there were games throughout Bradley's tenure where the US looked strong playing them. However, he showed an inability to change these formations and move to ones with three-man center midfields when the tactics of the opposition dictated that he should have.

One of the biggest problems that can arise defensively for a team using a 4-4-2 is the gap of space that often opens up between the two center midfielders and the back four. In a 4-4-2 the center midfielders are responsible for getting tight on the opposition center midfielders. If they're forced to push high up the field to do this, it can create dangerous pockets of space in front of the back four for opposition attackers to move in to. Opponents who receive the ball in these areas have time to turn and dribble at the back four. This forces the center backs to make a decision to either contain the dribbler and continue to back up or to step out and try to win a tackle. If they continue to contain they run the risk of allowing the man in possession to get into a dangerous shooting position. But if one center back steps it allows the opposition to play dangerous through balls into the space left vacated by the stepping center back. I've labeled this gap "problem area" in the diagram below. One way to minimize these gaps between center mids and center backs is to push the back four high up the field towards the center midfielders. However, holding a high defensive line comes with its own risks. High lines are susceptible to balls over the top or slipped in behind the back four, particularly when your center backs lack pace to keep up with opposition forwards. They also require an intelligent back four that knows when to collectively step forward to put the opposition offsides. With high defensive lines, the problem area therefore tends to become the space between the back four and goalkeeper.

The USA's performance at the 2010 World Cup offered a perfect illustration of a 4-4-2's defensive shortcomings in the center of the pitch. The US played a 4-4-2 in every game with Jozy Altidore paired with either Herculez Gomez or Robbie Findley at forward, Bradley in the center of midfield alongside either Edu, Torres, or Clark and Landon Donovan and Clint Dempsey occupying the wide areas. All three goals the US conceded in group play resulted from an opposition player making a dangerous run into the gap between the back four and midfield, leaving the US defense out of position. In the opening game against England, Wayne Rooney dropped back from his forward position into this gap (video below). Not wanting to allow the dangerous Rooney to get the ball in this space and turn, center back Oguchi Onyewu felt the need to step out of his position in the back four and track Rooney. This opened up a huge amount of space between the US's other center back, Jay DeMerit, and left back Carlos Bocanegra for an England player to burst into, something Steven Gerrard was all too happy to do. Rooney never touched the ball but his incisive movement had done the damage. Lampard's pass found its way to Emile Heskey who laid it through for Gerrard to comfortably tuck home. Clark, Bradley's partner in central midfield that day, often gets blamed for the goal and indeed he failed to track the run of Gerrard. However, the defensive system was more to blame than Clark. As a center midfielder you're used to passing off forward runs to your center backs. He did a poor job of reading the situation, but the gap in defense should have never opened up. Even if he'd tracked Gerrard from the outset, the England midfielder still may have beat him in a foot race into the space.

England were also lined up in a 4-4-2 that day. Had Bradley gone with three central midfielders, the US would have had a spare man in the center of the park to sit just in front of the back four. That would have allowed Onyewu to pass Rooney off to the spare midfielder rather than getting himself out of position by tracking him. The gap would have never opened up for Rooney to run into, and that goal would likely have never happened.

In the US's second game against Slovenia, Clark was replaced with Torres but the US kept it's 4-4-2 shape. Again, they were made to pay for allowing the opposition to get into pockets of space between DeMerit and Onyewu at center back and Bradley and Torres in the middle of the pitch. In the video below (at 1:09), Valter Birsa drifts unmarked into a 20-yard gap in front of the back four. He receives the ball, turns and shoots before DeMerit or Onyewu are able to step. His finish was incredible, but the amount of space he was given to drift into was criminal and a product of the US's flat, four-man midfield.

Slovenia's second goal again came from an opposition player drifting into the problem gap. Forward Milivoje Novakovic drifts away from the US center backs to receive the ball in the gap where he can turn and slip it through for his forward partner Ljubijankic. The bulk of the blame for this goal, however, falls on Onyewu for his woeful positioning. The other three defenders had done their job pushing forward to close the gap and make the defense more compact. Onyewu was likely positioned so deep because he was worried about his lack of pace being exposed with a ball played in behind him. He wanted to keep Ljubikankic in front of him rather than on his shoulder.

Less than a year on from the World Cup, Bradley hadn't learned his lesson. In a friendly with Spain, he fielded a 4-4-2 against a Spanish side lined up in a 4-3-3 with a world class central midfield trio of Sergio Busquets, Xabi Alonso, and Santi Cazorla. Outmanned in the midfield, the US were subsequently picked apart 4-0. That two of the four goals were scored by Cazorla, an attacking midfielder who makes a living finding pockets of space between defense and midfield, is no surprise.

The obvious key defensive feature of three-man central midfields is that they provide an extra layer of defensive depth in midfield. The extra midfielder can fill the most dangerous areas of space in front of the back four. Incredibly, even after the World Cup and the battering from Spain, Bradley refused to accept his side was often being overrun in midfield. In the end it would cost him his job as he again fielded a 4-4-2 against Mexico in the Gold Cup final. El Tri's first and third goals came from players receiving the ball unmarked in gaps in the middle of the field. (You can see the goals here at 2:30 and 4:28.)

Klinsmann would have certainly recognized the reasons behind the US's rather porous defense under Bradley. He has experimented with a number of different formations, 4-4-2 included, and has said he picks his formations based on the strengths of the players he has available and the style of play of the opposition. In other words, he is flexible and likes his teams to be able to play a number of different styles. But one feature that has been fairly consistent in Klinsmann's lineups is a three-man central midfield. Whether a 4-3-3, 4-2-3-1 or diamond 4-4-2, he has shown that he likes to have one center midfielder available to sit in gaps just in front of the back four to prevent the opposition from receiving the ball in these dangerous areas. It has worked to shore up the defense. The US have conceded more than one goal in only three games under Klinsmann. Of the four goals conceded in this World Cup qualifying round, three have come from free kicks. The difficulty the US have had creating genuine goal-scoring opportunities against weaker CONCACAF opposition has been frustrating, but that phase of the game will come as players like Landon Donovan recover from injury.

Jurgen Klinsmann has made the US a more sophisticated side to match up against, and that will have its benefits in the long run.

Pardew Dilemma: when to pair Ba, Cisse in 4-4-2

In Newcastle's 3-0 defeat to Manchester United this weekend, Alan Pardew opted for a 4-4-2 with Papiss Cisse and Demba Ba paired at center forward, Cheick Tiote and Yohan Cabaye in the center of midfield, Jonas Guitierrez at left midfield and Hatem Ben Arfa on the right. The game would ultimately highlight one of the major problems that can arise when fielding a 4-4-2 with only two central midfielders- the tendency to get overrun in the center of the park against a team fielding more than two central midfielders. Manchester United fielded a 4-4-2 as well but they opted for a narrow diamond with Wayne Rooney at attacking midfield, Michael Carrick playing the holding role, and Tom Cleverley and Shinji Kagawa getting up and down the pitch as "shuttlers." Outnumbered 2 vs. 4 in the middle of the park, Newcastle couldn't compete for the ball in midfield and Manchester United dominated possession and went up 2-0 within 15 minutes.

After the game there were some interesting comments from Newcastle supporters on various discussion boards about whether they are a better side playing a 4-4-2 with Cisse and Ba alongside one another as center forwards or playing with Cisse as a lone center forward with Ba occupying a role on the left in either a 4-3-3, 4-5-1 or 4-2-3-1 as they did at times last season. Using Ba on the left in any of the latter three formations allows Newcastle to play three central midfielders rather than the two of their traditional 4-4-2. This should enable Newcastle to compete better in midfield against teams playing more than two central midfielders. However, it also means opposition center backs only have one center forward to worry about (typically Cisse). They can mark the forward with one center back while the other tucks in to provide cover. In a 4-4-2, both center backs are occupied by strikers and therefore don't have the luxury of another center back providing cover if a defensive mistake is made.

Which system is better for Pardew's side depends largely on the quality and formation of the opposition. Against opponents who line up in a 4-4-2, I fancy Cabaye and Tiote's chances to win the midfield battle and, in those circumstances, think it's usually a fine strategy for Newcastle to also field a 4-4-2. In a 2 v. 2 central midfield battle, Tiote and Cabaye will usually be able to get on the ball and pick out Cisse and Ba who are big, powerful and good finishers capable of giving any center back pairing in the league fits. However, against teams that play with a third center midfielder, it becomes really difficult for Cabaye and Tiote to compete for possession and find opportunities to knock balls into the two forwards.

To provide a brief comparison, in games in which Ba and Cisse have been on the field together as a center forward pairing in a 4-4-2, Newcastle score an average of 1.06 goals and concede an average of 1.3 goals (note: I only included goals scored and goals conceded that occurred when both men were on the field; goals for and against that occurred after one or both had been substituted were not included). In games in which Cisse plays center forward and Ba plays on the left in either a 4-3-3, 4-5-1 or 4-2-3-1, Newcastle score an average of 1.2 goals and concede an average of 1.2 goals. This very basic comparison suggests Newcastle have been slightly better offensively and defensively in formations with Cisse in the middle and Ba on the left than in a 4-4-2. Of course, without accounting for other very important factors like the quality of Newcastle's opponent and the formation of their opponent, we can't say with any certainty that the reason for the differences in performance comes down to formation. In the near future I'll try to provide a game-by-game analysis of how Newcastle's formations have fared against different opposition formations to get a better of idea when Pardew should be pairing Ba and Cisse in a 4-4-2 and when he should play one wide in a system with three center midfielders.

Preview: Arsenal vs. West Ham

Possible Lineups:

Arsenal will line up in their usual 4-2-3-1. With Diaby out due to a hamstring injury, we may see Ramsey slide back from an attacking right-sided position to a central position alongside Arteta. Coquellin was given the start alongside Arteta in the Champions League in midweek but against a West Ham side that lacks a strong creative presence in the center of midfield, Arteta should be fine occupying the holding midfield role on his own. Ramsey will provide more going forward than Coquellin. Despite a run of relatively unimpressive performances, Oxlade-Chamberlain will likely be given the start on the right. With Andy Carroll expected to be given the nod at center forward for West Ham, expect Per Mertesacker to replace Koscielny to provide some height at the back.

Expect West Ham to line up in a 4-2-3-1 that operates more as a 4-5-1 when Arsenal are in possession, with the two wingers dropping back alongside Diame and Noble to form two banks of four. Jarvis looked lively on the left wing in West Ham's 2-1 win over QPR Monday but, against Arsenal, Sam Allardyce may opt for the more defensive Matthew Taylor. O'Brien and Reid both picked up knocks in the QPR game. Reid is expected to play while O'Brien's status is less certain- we could see George McCartney replace him at left back. Andy Carroll is expected to be given the start after he returned from a hamstring injury Monday.

West Ham

• O'Brien (McCartney) and Demel will likely be fairly reluctant to join in the attack when in possession so as not to leave spaces behind them for Podolski and Oxlade-Chamberlain to counter into.
• Diame, Nolan and Noble will all look to shuffe the ball into wide areas to the wingers Vaz Te or Jarvis (if he plays). They'll try to either hit an early ball into Carroll towards the back post or take on the Arsenal outside backs and then cross. When West Ham do look for Carroll at the back post, he'll have the option of either going for goal himself or knocking the ball down. Nolan will look to get close to him to win the second ball.
• West Ham's back four will play long balls directly into Carroll. When they took this direct route Monday with Carlton Cole at forward, Jarvis would cut in from the left wing and run behind Cole to get on the end of a flicked header. 
• The Hammers will try to win as many free kicks as possible. They'll hoof the ball in towards Carroll from set pieces anywhere on the field and look to get on the end of his knock downs.

Arsenal

• The Gunners should dominate possession the center of midfield.
• West Ham will likely play a 4-5-1 in defense with the wingers dropping back to form a bank of four with Diame and Noble. Jenkinson and Gibbs should be brave with their offensive positioning, getting into advanced positions and pushing the West Ham wingers deep into their own half. This will leave Carroll isolated when West Ham do recover possession. They'll be forced to knock it long towards Carroll and hope he can hold possession until the midfield transitions forward.
• With Gervinho at center forward, Arsenal will be very flexible in the center of the park. Look for Cazorla, Gervinho and Ramsey to find pockets of space in between the lines to get on the ball. They'll play short combinations of passes and look for seams in the back four to get in behind. They could find it difficult against a crowded back four.
• Arsenal have to improve their set piece defending. Three of the four goals they've conceded in the Premier League have come from set pieces and in West Ham they're facing an opponent who thrives at scoring from deadball situations. Koscielny was largely responsible for the two goals conceded to Chelsea last weekend and in all likelihood he'll be replaced by the taller Mertesacker to provide some height. However, despite his 6'6" frame, Mertesacker's aerial ability has at times been suspect. He'll have to be diligent in aerial challenges with Carroll.

Recap: West Ham 2-1 QPR

West Ham scored twice from lofted crosses to the back post to secure a win in a gritty game lacking in technical quality.

Combined, the two sides completed just 504 passes, the third fewest in a Premier League game this season (Reading vs. Stoke produced a remarkably low 369 completed passes and Norwich vs. QPR had just 455 completed passes).

West Ham lined up in a 4-5-1 with Carlton Cole given the start at forward. Andy Carroll returned to the substitutes bench after being sidelined with a hamstring injury. QPR employed a 4-4-2 with Djibril Cisse and Bobby Zamora at forward. Shaun Wright Phillips played right wing and Ji Sung Park operated on the left but slightly more narrow.

Central Midfield Zone

West Ham's 4-5-1 gave them a man advantage in the center of midfield and they used their numerical superiority to completely prevent QPR's two central midfielders, Esteban Granero and Alejandro Faurlin, from getting on the ball. With virtually no presence in the center of midfield, QPR struggled to link play between defense and attack and were forced too often to hit hopeful long balls to the corners for Cisse and Zamora. Faurlin and Granero completed just 46 and 35 passes respectively, fairly low numbers for center midfielders. Combined they completed only 20 passes in the attacking third. It was apparent within 25 minutes that QPR needed an extra man in the center of midfield to allow them to get some possession and build play through the midfield. However, Mark Hughes stuck with just the two center midfielders for the whole first half and QPR continued to struggle to develop any rhythm in their play.

West Ham's Crossing and Direct Play
Despite their numerical advantage in the center of midfield, West Ham showed little interest in using the extra man to control possession. They looked to get the ball in wide areas to wingers Matthew Jarvis and Ricardo Vaz Te to send crosses into the box or knock the ball long into Cole for him to flick on. The midfield trio of Kevin Nolan, Mark Noble and Mohamed Diame completed just 26, 46 and 22 passes respectively. When they did get the ball they looked to shuffle it to Vaz Te and Jarvis. As is so often the case at West Ham, Cole was often an isolated figure up front but he did well to hold the ball up and flick on aerial challenges. When the Hammers played the ball long out of the back, Jarvis would tuck in and run behind Cole for the flick. It was pretty rudimentary stuff but QPR never looked comfortable defending crosses into the box.

Substitutions
Sam Allardyce was forced to make two like-for-like substitutions in the first half when Winston Reid and Joey O'Brien had to exit due to injury for West Ham. James Tomkins replaced Reid and George McCartney replaced O'Brien.


After 56 minutes Hughes finally addressed the need for extra bodies in the center of midfield and replaced Wright-Phillips with Samba Diakite and Park with Adel Taarabt. Diakite played in the middle, forming a central midfield trio with Fuarlin and Granero. Taarabt played narrow on the left but cut into the middle frequently and seemed to be given free reign to move into positions to get on the ball. The change in shape paid immediate dividends for QPR. Diakite provided an extra body in the midfield and some powerful runs forward while Taarabt gave QPR some creativity and urgency in the final third. Immediately the home sign began to control the play and were finally able to effectively transition the ball from the defensive third to attack. Taarabt's goal was a bit of individual brilliance but he was able to cut in from the left and take the shot because West Ham's center midfielders were occupied elsewhere.

With his side clinging to a 2-1 lead and being overrun in the center of the park, Allardyce would have been wise to use his final substitution to pull either Jarvis or Vaz Te for a player that could compete and win balls in the center of midfield. Yossi Benayoun and Gary O'Neil were the only two midfielders on the West Ham subs bench so O'Neil probably would have been the preferred choice. However, Allardyce elected to go with another like-for-like sub, replacing Cole with Carroll.

Just three minutes after Carroll's introduction, Diakite picked up a second yellow for QPR. Their brief spell of midfield dominance ended and West Ham were able to see out the 2-1 win.

Conclusion
This was a game of rather poor quality but an entertaining one to watch develop nonetheless. Against a relatively combative West Ham center midfield three, Hughes should have moved away from his 4-4-2 with wingers earlier to get an extra body in the center of midfield. He ultimately made the right substitutions but why he waited 11 minutes into the second half when it was painfully obvious QPR had no midfield presence is a mystery. 

The modern football sweeper

"The fishing fleet lies dark against the sun-washed sea. Along the Tyrrhenian waterfront, a stressed football manager, unable to sleep, takes an early-morning walk. Oblivious to the shrieking of the gulls and the haggling of the dockside mongers, he strides on, asking himself again and again how he can get the best out of his side, ponders how he can strengthen a defence that, for all his best efforts, remains damagingly porous. As he paces the harbour, churning the problem over and over in his head, a boat catches his eye. The fishermen haul in one net, swollen with fish, and then behind it, another: the reserve net. This is his eureka moment. Some fish inevitably slip the first net, but they are caught by the second; he realises that what his side needs is a reserve defender operating behind the main defense to catch those forwards who slip through. That manager was Gipo Viani, his team was Salernitana, and his invention was catenaccio."

-Excerpt from Jonathan Wilson's Inverting the Pyramid: The History of Football Tactics on the development of catenaccio, the system made famous by Helenio Herrera at Inter Milan in the 1960s. The system employed a libero, or sweeper, who sat in behind a line of man marking defenders to provide cover and focused on counter attacking with long balls out of the back. In Herrera's version, the libero played behind four man marking defenders (in other versions the libero sat behind three defenders), creating a five man defense in a 5-3-2 formation. Inter would win three Italian league titles, two European Cups and two Intercontinental Cups under Herrera.

Herrera's version of catenaccio ultimately fell out of favor after Inter were beaten 2-0 by Ajax in the final of the 1972 European Cup. Inter's rigid four man markers were drug all over the field by the fluid movement of Ajax's total football and, subsequently, zonal defending became the norm in professional football.

While man marking is a thing of the past and no top level teams use a traditional libero, certain teams have employed systems that, if not directly influenced by catenaccio, have stemmed from the need to address the same concerns catenaccio was attempting to address: particularly the need to have a free man at the back to provide cover. Juventus's current 3-5-2 system is quite similar to Hererra's 1-4-3-2 catennacio. Both used three central defenders. Although Juventus's three central defenders are more fluid and there is no designated libero to sit deep, the idea is to allow two to pick up attackers moving into their zone while one can drop slightly deeper and provide cover, the same philosophy behind Herrera's system (although Herrera's two center backs marked men rather than zones). Three central defenders allow Juventus's full backs to push higher up the field into attacking positions when in possession, operating as what we call wing backs. Again, this is something Hererra was doing in the 1960s. With ample cover in the center of defense, he would allow left back Giacinto Facchetti license to push on and join in the attack.

Michael Cox has written in his Zonal Marking blog of teams using a more modern version of a sweeper whose positioning is different to that of the traditional deep lying sweeper. He suggests the modern version of a sweeper is a defensive center midfielder that plays in front of a four man defense with attacking outside backs. When his team is in possession, this holding midfielder drops into the center of defense while the two center backs move wide on either side of him, forming a back three. This gives the two outside backs the freedom to push into the attacking third without leaving only two center backs to defend any counters that may spring. Barcelona have used this system to great effect with Sergio Busquets dropping between center backs Carles Puyol and Gerard Pique, allowing Dani Alves and Erica Abidal (now Jordi Alba) to get into very attacking positions. I highly recommend this article from Cox if you want a more detailed explanation on the use of this more modern sweeper system. Jonathan Wilson also wrote a fascinating piece on this subject for the Guardian back in 2010 that you can see here. 

Although both Barcelona and Juventus's systems represent modern day versions of sweeper systems, they're quite different in style and philosophy. The defense in Juventus's 3-5-2 sits deeps, invites the opposition to get forward, then looks to spring quick counters. Barcelona's defense makes the field compact by holding a very high line while the 6 attacking players press the ball. Their attack is focused on ball retention and dominating possession. Both employ three at the back with fullbacks providing width high up the field when in possession, but they differ in where on the field they like to do their defending and the importance placed on keeping the ball. These two teams offer a stark example of how systems fairly similar in defensive shape can be quite different in practice.

Preview: Arsenal vs. Chelsea

Possible Lineup :

Both sides will likely start in their normal 4-2-3-1 formations. Aaron Ramsey was brought into the Arsenal lineup last weekend against Manchester City on the right although his positioning was quite narrow, creating what was effectively a four man central midfield for Arsenal. This enabled Arsenal to control possession in the middle of the park in an impressive 1-1 draw at the Etihad and Wenger may look to stick with the young Welshman Saturday. Width will come from Podolski on the left and when Arsenal look to break it will likely be through him and Cazorla. Vermaelen is expected to be back in the side after illness sidelined him last weekend. Koscielny therefore will likely be relegated back to the bench despite a goal and an overall impressive performance at Manchester City.

Chelsea's starting XI is a bit more difficult to predict. Roberto Di Matteo has preferred Oscar in the center attacking midfield role in Chelsea's last two games, a 1-0 win over Stoke and a 2-2 Champions League draw with Juventus. Oscar was brought into the side against Juventus to defend Andrea Pirlo in his deep lying creative midfield role. Pirlo is tremendous at dictating the tempo of games and getting defenses out of position with his passing- by tasking Oscar with man marking him, RDM was looking to unsettle Juventus and prevent them from getting into any type of offensive rhythm. In Mikel Arteta, Arsenal have a creative deep lying midfielder similarly gifted at dictating the tempo of games. RDM may well use a similar strategy as he did against Juventus, unsettling Arsenal by using Oscar to keep him off the ball. If Oscar does get the nod at center attacking midfield, expect Hazard and Mata to play on either side of him. They'll drift inside and switch sides frequently. Given Hazard's dribbling ability and the relative inexperience of Arsenal right back Carl Jenkinson, look for Hazard to start on the left and try to take on Jenksinson with the dribble.

1. If Ramsey starts on the right and drifts towards the center, as he did against Manchester city, it could cause Chelsea some serious problems in midfield. It would give Arsenal a 4 v. 3 advantage in the middle of the park (Arteta, Diaby, Cazorla, Ramsey vs. Mikel, Lampard, Oscar). Mikel would likely stay close to Cazorla, Lampard would have to keep an eye on Ramsey and more than likely Oscar will stay close to Arteta to take away Arsenal's deep lying creative threat and the person who dictates tempo for the Gunners. Therefore we could see Diaby unaccounted for meaning he'll have the space to make those powerful runs forward with the ball. The numerical advantage would also suggest Arsenal could boss the midfield and dominate possession.
2. How adventurous Ivanovic is getting forward could be another key factor. He enjoys joining in the attack but isn't particularly quick to recover when Chelsea lose possession. Therefore Chelsea can at times be susceptible to counters down the right side (last season's Champions League away defeat to Napoli is a good example). With Lucas Podolski occupying the left side for Arsenal, the Gunners have a player who tracks back and defends well but also has the pace to get in behind the opposition right back when Arsenal win possession (Arsenal's first goal against Liverpool is a perfect example). If Ivanovic is adventurous and plays high up the pitch, expect Podolski to enjoy plenty of room down the left to sprint into. If I were RDM I'd be a bit cautious with the Serbian's positioning.
   
3. If Chelsea do play deep and allow Arsenal to control possession, do Arsenal have the ability to unlock a crowded defense? So far draws to Sunderland and Stoke, Arsenal's two opponents that defended deep with two banks of four, suggest they do not. Without a ruthless finisher like Van Persie could struggle to turn dominant possession into goals.
4. Chelsea would be wise to play Hazard on the left. While Arsenal's right sided defenders Mertesacker and Jenkinson have had solid starts to the season, neither player instills the confidence in their one v. one defending ability to deal with someone as quick and clever with the dribble as Hazard. He could give those two fits. 
5. Chelsea looked desperately short of ideas last weekend when Stoke played them deep and kept their defense compact in the center of the pitch. Both Mata and Hazard like to come inside to get on the ball when they occupy wide roles so the Blues can become a bit narrow and a bit one dimensional. There's virtually no chance Arsenal will sit deep and allow the Blues to take the game to them at home (in all likelihood it'll be the other way around) but the Gunners should take note of how much Chelsea have struggled under RDM when they're forced to take the game to the opponent. They're more dangerous on the break and Arsenal should look to force them to slowly build attacks from the back.
6. Too often this season Chelsea have given the ball away cheaply and left their back four exposed to counters (John Obi Mikel's giveaway that led to Juventus's second goal in the Champions League is an obvious example). It's crucial that when Mikel and Lampard advance up the field Chelsea keep hold of the ball or Cazorla will have a field day breaking into space behind the two holding midfielders.

Links, 9/27/12 Edition

• Michael Cox: Why the hate for zonal marking?
•  "The chief criticism of defending zonally is that no one takes responsibility, an argument that misses the point entirely. Ex-coaches who persist with this line of debate are actually adopting quite a cowardly approach -- "No one takes responsibility" is a synonym for "There's no player I can blame." Ironically, it also demonstrates that they're unwilling to take responsibility themselves."

• Chris Rowland: Football and Finance, Liverpool and the top six
• " I hope I have been able to show a number of things. First, a realisation of just how catastrophically wrong things went in the years ’09/10 – ’10/11. Liverpool had turned into a club who changed managers on a yearly basis, wasted vast sums on a phantom stadium which couldn’t possibly be financed, had begun the trend of decreased transfer spending and swapped it for vast ineffective wage inflation, relying on player sales to break even."

• Jonathan Wilson: The question: How troubling is Liverpool's start
• Already there has been a marked improvement in pass completion, up from 80.9% to 86%, and from 73.24% to 78.9% in the opposition half. To put that into context, last year's figures were the best for Liverpool over a full season since Opta began collating data in 2006-07.The problem is all too familiar. Last season Liverpool converted only 9.13% of their chances, the lowest figure since Opta began producing its reports. It had been 13.59% the previous season but then Liverpool managed just 11.4 shots per game. When Liverpool finished second in 2008-09, they had 15.1 shots per game and converted 13.46% of their chances. But if 9.13% looked bad, this season's figure is far worse: a meagre 5.97%.
   

Everton 3-0 Swansea: Everton attack down left and exploit Fellaini's aerial ability

Everton used Marauane Fellaini's height advantage on dead balls and attacked almost entirely down the left through Leighton Baines and Steven Peinaar in a dominant 3-0 win over Swansea at Liberty Stadium.

David Moyes' side set out in a 4-4-1-1 with Victor Anichebe getting the start at center forward for the injured Nikica Jelavic with Fellaini tucked in behind him. Swansea played their normal 4-2-3-1 with Pablo Hernandez given the start on the right over Nathan Dyer and Leon Britton left on the subs bench.

Everton Press
Defensively, Everton pressed the Swansea back four with Anichebe, Peinaar, Fellaini, and right midfielder Kevin Mirallas. Leon Osman and Phil Neville sat deeper in the center of the midfield closer to the Toffees' back four. This created a gap between the four players pressing and the two holding midfielders but it wasn't space Swansea was able to exploit. The high pressing of Everton's four most advanced players prevented Swansea from settling into any sort of a rhythm in the attacking third of the field. The Swans completed 322 passes in the game, just 29 fewer than Everton, but only 69 of those were in the attacking third (21%). Everton were happy to allow the Swansea back four to pass the ball sideways amongst themselves and the Welsh side rarely looked like penetrating into the attacking third.

Everton Attack
Going forward, Everton focused its attack on the left side of the pitch where Baines and Peinaar combined throughout the afternoon with some tidy interchanges. The two accounted for the second and fourth most pass combinations in the game- there were 15 Baines to Peinaar combinations and 14 Peinaar to Baines combinations. Often Anichebe would drift to the left as well, overloading the right side of the Swansea defense while Fellaini would move into the center of the box, offering a dangerous physical presence to feed the ball into. The graphic below shows Everton's passes in the final third. Notice the number of those that occurred down the left hand side.

Interestingly, Everton's one goal that didn't result from a set piece came from a rare counter down the right flank. Fellaini won the ball deep in his own half and found an outlet pass to Peinaar who had drifted to the opposite side of the field. The South African found Mirallas bursting through the middle and the Belgian tucked it home.

Moyes also clearly set out to exploit Fellaini's height on set pieces, as he did in their season opening win over Manchester United. Any free kick the Toffees earned within 50 yards of the goal they'd get numbers into the box and lump it to the back post for Fellaini. Swansea had a miserable time dealing with the tall Belgian all afternoon and the tactic bore fruit for Everton in the 22nd minute when Fellaini won a high dead ball at the back post and flicked on for Anichebe who finished from 6 yards out to open the scoring. Replays showed Fellaini had clearly handled the ball into the path of Anichebe but the defending was poor from Ashley Williams to allow Fellaini to get the initial touch with his chest. The Belgian would go on to score himself in the 82nd minute, heading in another set piece from the left side at the front post.

Conclusion
Everton's four man high press prevented Swansea from getting any sort of meaningful possession in the attacking third. Swansea were entirely unable to cope with Baines and Peinaar down Everton's left side and failed to deal with aerial challenges with Fellaini. In the end the home side was fortunate it was only 3-0 as Anichebe was guilty of missing a couple of very good opportunities. Moyes will be thrilled with his side's performance as they continue their uncharacteristically bright start to the season.