3 Thoughts from France 3-0 Honduras

1. Honduras were ultimately made to pay for their overt physicality:

Coming into the World Cup Honduras were expected to be one of the more aggressive sides. Competing in their second consecutive World Cup is a fantastic achievement for the tournament's 6th smallest country but they'll always lack the individual quality of their opponents at this stage. As a result they look to compete by defending in deep banks of four and getting stuck in to their opponents. England complained about Honduras's aggression after the two sides met in a friendly in Miami early this month and the Central American side put in a similarly combative performance today. They should be proud of a spirited first 45 minutes but they were consistently playing on the edge of what is legal. They conceded two early free kicks in the opening 15 minutes down the right channel, one that forced a fine save off the crossbar from Noel Valladares off a close range shot from Blaise Matuidi. Wilson Palacios was fortunate to escape with a yellow card after stomping on Paul Pogba- who reacted petulantly by kicking out at Palacios and was probably fortunate to escape a red card of his own. Palacios would be given his marching orders before the end of the half however after foolishly running through the back of Pogba in the penalty area. The referee had no choice but to brandish a second yellow and from their it was an impossible task for the Hondurans. Karim Benzema converted the resulting penalty and France were comfortable for the remainder.

2. Win should provide confidence boost for France side known for its volatility:

After France's humiliating exit at the 2010 World Cup when players refused to train in protest of Nicolas Anelka's expulsion from the side, it was important France got off to a strong start in Brazil to restore some confidence in the national side. Manager Didier Deschamps placed great importance on creating a harmonious environment, leaving the talented but divisive Samir Nasri out of the side altogether. Aside from the injured Franck Ribery, Deschamps started the same side that defeated Ukraine 3-2 in Paris in a playoff to get to Brazil. Although they struggled in the opening half to break down a well organized Honduras side, they looked a cohesive enough unit. There's enough talent in the side to give any team in the tournament troubles if they play well. They would have expected to beat Honduras but nonetheless the ease with which they strolled to the three points should give them important belief moving forward.

3. Benzema's contribution key to France success:

France won the 1998 World Cup despite starting the quarter final, semi final and final with a lone center forward that didn't register a goal throughout the tournament- Stephane Guivarc'h. That tournament was played on home soil and the side was littered with attacking talent elsewhere on the pitch that could provide goals. Although Paul Pogba, Mathieu Valbuena and Antoine Griezmann all offer a genuine goal threat, it's difficult to imagine this French side making a deep run into the tournament without strong performances from their #9 Karim Benzema (he actually wears the #10). Benzema is coming off a good season at Real Madrid where he scored 26 goals and provided 13 assists in all competitions and won the Copa del Rey and Champions League. His performance today suggests a player in form. He scored twice and created a third with a header that hit the post before deflecting in off the Honduras goalkeeper, narrowly missing out on becoming just the second French player to score a World Cup hat trick after Just Fontaine.

Oscar shines for Brazil on same day Chelsea sign Fabregas

Brazil's media narrative dictates Neymar will receive the plaudits for Brazil's 3-1 win over Croatia but it was Oscar who was their stand out performer. The Chelsea midfielder's ability to contribute both in possession and in defense is highly impressive and his range of abilities were on display today- he tirelessly pressed Croatia's midfielders, was a threat going forward and finished the contest off with a clever toe-poked finish.

Oscar played on the right of an attacking midfield 3, a slightly unusual role for him with Brazil where he typically plays as a #10. Today it was Neymar who played through the middle with Hulk on the left. The system was likely designed to get the most out of Neymar. Croatia play without a typical defensive, ball winning holding midfielder so Brazil manager Luis Felipe Scolari was likely trying to exploit what he thought would be a defensively soft area of the pitch for Croatia.

It was interesting to see Oscar put in such an impressive shift from a wide starting position on the same day Chelsea signed Cesc Fabregas, a player he may well compete with for the starting #10 role in the Premier League this season. If Fabregas is given that role over the course of the season, Oscar's versatility means he could still find himself in the first 11 on the wing. Jose Mourinho has praised the Brazilian's selflessness and commitment to defending. His first half tackle on Luca Modric, in which he sprinted 20 yards to catch the Real Madrid midfielder as it looked like Croatia might have something on on the break, is a perfect example of why he's difficult to leave out of any lineup.

He has plenty of experience playing a wide role at club level. In his first season at Chelsea he played mostly on the right as Juan Mata had the #10 role locked up. Even playing the #10 role under Mourinho last season he would often rotate positions with the wide players and drift into the channels to create overloads so he's comfortable operating in the channel.

In all likelihood Mourinho will use both Fabregas and Oscar as #10s depending on the opposition. He sees Oscar's ability to press the opposition's deepest lying midfielder as one of his strongest attributes and will want him playing through the middle when Chelsea set out to apply heavy midfield pressure, as they did in the 6-0 win over Arsenal.

Against opposition that looks to sit in deep and force Chelsea to play proactively, Mourinho could opt for Fabregas whose creativity and ability to play a final penetrating ball can unlock defenses. The side struggled to break down weaker opposition last season. Fabregas's ability on the ball should give them more invention in the final third.

Crucially, the signing adds depth and means both players should receive valuable rest over the course of the season. Oscar experienced a mid season dip in form last season- the result of having played two straight years of football because of summer tournaments with Brazil in the 2012 Olympics and 2013 Confederations Cup.

Fabregas's signing will make Chelsea a deeper, more creative and more tactically flexible side but it will in no way mitigate Oscar's influence on the side. The Brazilian's performance today showed he's simply too good at too many facets of the game to become a bit part player in West London.

Is 2014 destined to be a repeat of 1998 for the U.S. team?

Members of the U.S. team participate in an open training session outside of Washington, DC before a friendly vs. Brazil in May of 2012.

The United States had not qualified for the World Cup since 1950 when Paul Caliguiri scored an all-important goal in Port of Spain to defeat Trinidad & Tobago and secure a U.S. berth to the 1990 World Cup in Italy. In each of the past six World Cups (1990 through 2010), the performance of the U.S. team has exhibited an obvious if not especially meaningful pattern: the team falters at the group stage in every other World Cup (1990, 1998, and 2006) and advances at least past the group stage in the subsequent tournament (1994, 2002, and 2010).

Will the 2014 U.S. team follow this pattern and suffer elimination at the group stage in Brazil? Unfortunately, this U.S. team bears several eerie similarities to the 1998 team, which finished the tournament dead last with three losses and a goal difference of -4, rather than say, the 2002 U.S. team, which genuinely outplayed the Germans in the quarterfinals and missed out on a trip to the semifinals because of a blatant handball on the goal line. While mostly inconsequential, the similarities between the 2014 team and the 1998 team are striking enough to be a bit disconcerting:

• Controversy surrounding the inclusion of dual citizens in the squad late in the World Cup cycle – As in the 1998 tournament when coach Steve Sampson added French-American David Regis, Jurgen Klinsmann has opted to include several dual nationals. Most controversially, Klinsmann named 18-year-old, German-American Julian Green to the roster whose first-team experience at the time of the decision was limited to a 58th-minute substitute appearance for the U.S. in a friendly vs. Mexico and an 87th-minute substitute appearance for Bayern Munich in the Champions League. In other words, Klinsmann included a player on the roster who had just over a half an hour of cumulative first-team experience for club and country.
•  Controversy surrounding the exclusion of a marquee player – Again, like 1998 when then captain John Harkes was surprisingly omitted from the roster, Klinsmann unceremoniously cut Landon Donovan—arguably the best player in U.S. soccer history—when the U.S. coach pared the roster down from 30 to 23. While the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of Harkes turned out to be quite salacious (details of an affair between Harkes and Wynalda’s wife surfaced over a decade after that World Cup), Donovan’s exclusion seems to be the end product of a tumultuous relationship with Klinsmann rather than a relationship with a teammate’s wife.
•  Deployment of relatively unique tactics – In 1998, Steve Sampson utilized a 3-6-1 formation, which Matthew Doyle generously describes as “the first (and to date, only) truly revolutionary tactical innovation to come from American soccer.” Doyle’s description of the formation is wildly hyperbolic, as the formation is more aptly described as a fleeting tactical experiment that failed to yield success. While far less unorthodox than a 3-6-1, Klinsmann will likely field a diamond midfield rather than a 4-2-3-1 formation, which is expected to be the formation for many (if not most) of the sides in the 2014 World Cup.
• A difficult group that contains Germany – In 1998, the U.S., Germany, Yugoslavia, and Iran were drawn into Group F, and the 2014 U.S. team faces Germany, Portugal, and Ghana in Group G. While the 2014 group draw is likely more difficult than the 1998 draw, Germany and Yugoslavia were heavily favored to advance in 1998 just as Germany and Portugal are favored to advance in 2014. That said, the U.S. had a moderately difficult group in 2002 that included Portugal, and the U.S. managed to defeat Portugal and advance.

Are the similarities between the 2014 and 1998 teams cause for pessimism? Other than the difficulty of the group, I would argue probably not. I disagree with some of the roster decisions, especially Donovan’s omission, but, Michael Bradley aside, few individuals in the U.S. player pool stand out from one another. A diamond midfield, while interesting, isn’t particularly bizarre like a 3-6-1, and the U.S. team has looked steady in the formation in warm-up matches.

In the event of an exit at the group stage, the media will almost surely form a narrative about chemistry problems within the team based on conjecture and interviews with disgruntled players. For instance, after a short string of disappointing results during World Cup qualification, several players anonymously complained about “flagging faith in Klinsmann, his staff and his methods, along with the squad’s absence of harmony.” Of course, almost immediately after that article’s publication, Klinsmann’s disharmonious squad defeated Costa Rica in snowy conditions in Colorado and drew with Mexico at the intimidating Estadio Azteca. For the remainder of the 2013 calendar year, the U.S. team posted an impressive 16-3-2 record.

FiveThirtyEight gives the U.S. about a 35-percent chance of advancing past the group stage, while betting markets give the U.S. about a 27-percent chance. This is not to say that things within the control of the manager like tactics and personnel decisions don’t matter, but these decisions have somewhat limited influence on outcomes. If the U.S. team fails to advance past the group, the most likely, but more boring, explanation is simply that the U.S. is a good but not great team in an extremely difficult group.

Beckerman's inclusion results in Jermaine Jones's most influential attacking performance

For only the third time the USMNT started Kyle Beckerman, Jermaine Jones and Michael Bradley together in midfield. In their two previous warmup games against Azerbaijan and Turkey, the US started with a diamond 4-4-2 with Jones as the deepest midfielder just in front of the back four. Jones performed well in both of those contests but was given too much to do defensively as the US defended with a midfield bank of just 3 and left Bradley, Clint Dempsey and Altidore high up the pitch. As the deepest midfielder, Jones was also forced to sit deep in possession rather than choosing spots to drive forward from midfield and join the attack.

Yesterday's lineup was listed as a 4-2-3-1 with Jones and Beckerman operating in a double pivot, Michael Bradley playing in the #10 role behind Jozy Altidore and Clint Dempsey tucking inside from starting positions on the left. As it turned out however, it was basically the same diamond 4-4-2 we've been playing with the key addition of Beckerman giving the shape more defensive solidity than had been seen against Turkey. Although Beckerman hit one or two wayward passes he was typically solid in his defensive positioning and his presence at the base of midfield allowed Jones to play on the left of the midfield diamond and play the box-to-box role he is best suited for. Jones's powerful dribbling through midfield sprung a number of dangerous US attacks, including the one that led to Altidore's opener. He burst through the center and played the initial ball wide to Alejandro Bedoya. Without Beckerman in the side he isn't given the license to push into attacking areas. Jones had a sensational performance and it was due largely to the platform Beckerman provided him to get forward. Beckerman's own performance was unspectacular but it's no surprise Jones and Bradley were both at their most influential in the attacking half in a game he was in the side.

Beckerman certainly has his limitations that went mostly unnoticed against a surprisingly poor Nigeria side. He's not an especially mobile and athletic player and at times his distribution leaves something to be desired. However, his inclusion clearly gives the US a more solid defensive structure and allows the players in front of him more freedom to express themselves in the attacking half. The US looked as sharp as we've seen them in some time and this is a lineup I'm sure Klinsmann will seriously consider.

More on USMNT'S diamond midfield and other possible formations

Midway through the first half of yesterday's 2-1 win for the USMNT over Turkey I posted my concerns about what I see as the defensive frailties of playing with a diamond 4-4-2 formation. The post is short but to review my main points were:

1. Michael Bradley was staying high up the pitch when Turkey was in possession so the US was defending with a midfield of only 3- Jermaine Jones, Graham Zusi and Brad Davis.
   
2. Davis and Zusi tucked inside to offer Jones assistance against Turkey's 3 central midfielders.
   
3. By forcing Zusi and Davis to tuck inside we were conceding space in the channels to Turkey's fullbacks.
   
4. When Turkey got the ball wide into these areas it forced the US's fullbacks to step out of their defensive line and press the ball.
   
5. With the fullbacks stepping higher up the pitch to press the ball, large gaps formed between the fullbacks and center backs for Turkey to run into.
   

The screen shot below shows an example of the US's first half defensive shape. Michael Bradley is out of the picture while Zusi and Davis are relatively narrow to provide extra bodies in important central areas. There's space on the opposite channel for Turkey's right back to gallop into and attack. The play ultimately does end with the right back Gokhan Gonul getting the ball in the channel and playing a dangerous pass into the box for Mevlut Erdinc. The striker's effort at Tim Howard was tame but it was the type of build up you'd expect the likes of Germany, Portugal and Ghana to take advantage of.

US defend with midfield bank of 3.

The big issue with defending with just a midfield bank of 3 is that you have no wide midfielders/forwards tasked with marking the opposition fullbacks. If your opponent can switch the point of attack from one side of the field to the other quickly, they can cause real problems.

To his credit, Jurgen Klinsmann addressed the problem in his halftime interview. In the seond half when Turkey were in possession Michael Bradley dropped in alongside Kyle Beckerman (who had come on to replace Jones at the base of midfield) and the US defended in banks of four in more of a traditional flat 4-4-2 with the wider midfielders picking up Turkey's fullbacks.

I remain unconvinced Klinsmann will actually continue to play the diamond given the caliber of opposition in Group G but I've struggled to decide what I think the best shape for this team is against top opponents. I've been leaning towards a 4-2-3-1/4-3-3 with a midfield three of Beckerman sitting just in front of the back four, Jones shuttling forward into the attack from deeper areas and Bradley operating as the #10. I think this midfield gives you a nice midfield balance of positional intelligence in Beckerman, athleticism and energy in Jones and creativity and technique in Bradley. The problem with this shape however is that it doesn't leave room for Clint Dempsey to play in his natural second striker position. He could be used as the lone striker but then you're forced to bench Jozy Altidore, a player more suited to playing as a lone forward with his size. Alternatively you could play Altidore as the #9 with Dempsey tucking in from the left wing. The problem with Dempsey on the left however is that he's unlikely to provide his left back the type of protection you'd get from Alejandro Bedoya or Davis which could be crucial.

Another possibly suitable formation could be a 4-4-1-1 with Dempsey as the second striker behind Altidore and a center midfield pairing of Jones and Bradley- something we've seen plenty of before. The main problem here is that Jones and Bradley have never seemed to know their roles when playing together in a double pivot. Both tended to push forward at the same time, leaving the back four exposed on the break. Germany and Portugal are both sides that are capable of picking apart their opponents on the counter (see Portugal's 3-2 playoff win over Sweden or Germany's 4-0 dismantling of Argentina in the 2010 World Cup).

What are your thoughts on the best formation and personnel for the US in Brazil?

Thoughts on the USMNT's diamond formation 25 minutes into Turkey match

I've expressed my dislike of the USMNT playing a diamond 4-4-2 before. I think it leaves too much responsibility on the deepest center midfielder (Jermaine Jones today) to slow down quick transitions when the opposition regains possession. 25 minutes into the first half I believe we're seeing more shortcomings of the formation.

We're more or less defending with a midfield bank of three with Jones, Graham Zusi and Brad Davis. Bradley is currently staying higher up the pitch closer to Dempsey and Altidore. Zusi and Davis are tucking inside to offer Jones some defensive assistance in the middle of the park. The narrow positioning of Davis and and Zusi is resulting in acres of space for the Turkey fullbacks near the sidelines. Our fullbacks are therefore forced to step forward from their defensive line to close down Turkey's wide players. Our fullbacks stepping forward creates two dangerous scenarios: 1) it leaves space in behind for the Turkey fullbacks to drift wide into and 2) it creates large gaps between our fullbacks and center backs that Turkey can play penetrating passes into. We've been fortunate Turkey haven't been more clinical but they've found gaps in our defense and exploited them. Germany and Portugal won't be so wasteful in front of goal.

In defense of the 1994 U.S. World Cup uniforms

Pontiac Silverdome in Pontiac, MI: The pre-match ceremony before a group-stage match in the 1994 World Cup between the United States and Switzerland.

During the months before a world cup, sports writers often build anticipation for the quadrennial event with memories from world cups past. This summer marks the 20th anniversary of the 1994 World Cup in which the U.S., as hosts, shocked much of the world by advancing past the group stage.

In the build up to the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, unsurprisingly, the U.S. soccer media have focused much of their attention on the 1994 U.S. team (see, for instance, Roger Bennett’s four-part series for ESPN and Seth Vertelney’s long-form piece for SB Nation). Alan Siegel has an article on  Slate.com about the 1994 U.S. jerseys with the understated headline: “The Horrifying True Story of the Ugliest Jerseys in U.S. Soccer History.”

Siegel’s Slate article is certainly worth a read, but he seems to commit an error of anachronistic analysis: he harshly judges the ’94 faux-denim uniforms through a contemporary lens of soccer fashion almost entirely absent any historical context. It could be that I am misremembering given that I was only about 8 years old at the time and that it has been 20 years, or it could be that my fashion sense at age 8 wasn’t especially refined, but I distinctly remember those uniforms being awesome.

Siegel notes, “The jersey featured a denim print, oddly shaped floating white stars, and bright red trim, and it was made of 100 percent polyester.” The 1990s were something of an experimental period in soccer fashion full of strange geometry and bright colors. And, polyester uniforms were the norm at the time—moisture-wicking fabrics like Nike Dri-FIT and Adidas Climalite didn’t yet exist. The point is that those U.S. jerseys weren’t especially “out there” in 1994. The uniforms of Germany, Nigeria, and Spain (among many others) are similarly “ugly” through a contemporary lens. The U.S. jerseys were awesome in 1994 precisely because they were the essence of 1990s soccer fashion, and they remain awesome for that very reason.

In the article, Siegel describes the players’ reactions to first seeing the uniform based on retrospective accounts: “After the uniform unveiling, the normally loquacious Yanks didn’t say a word. ‘It was the longest silence I’d ever heard from our team,’ remembers forward Eric Wynalda. Then, laughter broke out.” Given the fashion trends in the sport at the time, I am skeptical as to whether the unveiling really went as such. As Thompson (1972) notes in his paper on the problems with the oral history method, “With retrospective interviews we have the additional problem of deciding whether they [subjects] are being influenced by recent changes in values and norms and so re-interpreting their perceptions.”

I should disclose that I am especially sensitive to criticism of the ‘94 U.S. World Cup uniform. The stonewashed faux-denim shirt clad with white stars was the first replica jersey that I owned. My grandparents bought me the kit for my 8th birthday. As excited as I was to receive the gift, I couldn’t hide my disappointment that they had bought the faux-denim shorts that were supposed to go with the red-and-white-striped away shirt rather than the star-clad home shirt; tears strewn down my face as I realized I wouldn’t be wearing the proper full kit to my two soccer practices that week.

To this day, that jersey remains one my most prized possessions, and it now fits my adult physique perfectly, which says a lot about the baggy design of jerseys in the 1990s and the surprising dearth of size options for smaller kids. It is my only item of clothing that anyone has offered to purchase off my back for cash (which has happened on multiple occasions).  Say what you want about the 1994 U.S. World Cup team, just don’t call their jerseys ugly.