In defeat Monk, Swansea provide blueprint for how to trouble Liverpool's 3-4-2-1

For the first 45 minutes of their 1-0 defeat to Liverpool last night Swansea were the vastly superior side. Liverpool established more control in the second half but still created little in the way of clear cut opportunities. Swansea's defeat was down to bad luck- Jordi Amat's sliding tackle bounced off Henderson and looped over Lukasz Fabianksi- and a combination of not enough end product and a solid performance from Simon Mignolet in the Liverpool goal. Gary Monk however deserves praise for how he set his team up tactically and Liverpool's future opponents may well have gained some insight into how to best contest a side that hasn't lost in the league since a Dec. 14 defeat to Manchester United.

During that game Brendan Rodgers used the 3-4-2-1 formation that has since brought Liverpool so much success. A major part of the success of the formation is that it gives Liverpool a numbers advantage in the middle of midfield when they are in possession. Most Premier League sides play with either a three man central midfield (either two holders behind a #10 as in a 4-2-3-1 or one holder with two shuttlers on either side as in a 4-3-3) or two man central midfield in a 4-4-2. Liverpool's 3-4-2-1 uses four central midfielders, two deeper lying holders and two attacking midfielders just behind the forward. The two attacking midfielders are given license to float into pockets of space and create passing angles for the back seven. This means Liverpool enjoy either a 4 v. 3 advantage in central zones or 4 v. 2. They therefore tend to have at least one free player able to move into dangerous space unmarked.

Monk looked to combat Liverpool's center midfield dominance by sacrificing wide midfielders in Swansea's usual 4-2-3-1 formation and instead going with a diamond 4-4-2. Jack Cork played at the base of midfield just in front of the back four with Jonjo Shelvey and Ki either side of him in box to box roles. Gylfi Sigurdsson played at the tip of the diamond just in behind the front pair of Bafetimbi Gomis and Wayne Routledge. Swansea therefore matched up evenly 4 v. 4 in the central midfield zone. This allowed Swansea to do two key things that I'll talk about in detail: #1) they were able to dominate possession and #2) when they lost the ball they were able to press Liverpool's two holding midfielders while still man marking the two attacking midfielders.

Swansea dominate possession

Defensively, Liverpool's two attacking midfielders stay high up the pitch rather than dropping off into midfield alongside the two deeper lying midfielders. This means Liverpool defend with a defensive line of three behind a midfield line of four with the attacking midfielders pressing higher up the pitch when they can. The graphic below shows a typical Liverpool defensive shape with the starters from last night.

Figure 1: Liverpool's 3-4-2-1 defensive shape

With the attacking midfielders (Lallana and Coutinho last night) high up the pitch it puts the responsibility of contesting the central midfield zone on the two holders (Joe Allen and Henderson). For Swansea, Cork maintained a deep position just in front of the center backs but both Shelvey and Ki moved into attacking zones. With Sigurdsson playing just off the two forwards through the middle Allen and Henderson were outnumbered 3 v. 2. If they both stepped forward to press Ki and Shelvey it left space between the lines for Sirgurdsson (Figure 2). Sigurdsson found these spaces frequently in the first half- he put a good chance over the bar after finding himself in space then moments later forced an excellent save from Mignolet.

Figure 2:  Both Henderson and Allen press Ki and Coutinho. This leaves space between the Liverpool lines for Sigurdsson.

If one of Allen or Henderson pressed Ki or Shelvey on the ball, and the other stayed in a deeper position to check the movement of Sigurdsson, it meant Ki and Shelvey could simply play a square pass to one another to easily maintain possession. In the example below Henderson steps out to press Ki in possession while Allen stays deep on Sigurdsson. Ki can play a square pass to Shelvey, switching the angle of attack and leaving Liverpool out of position defensively.

Figure 3: Here, Allen steps to Ki in possession and Henderson keeps a deeper position to deny Sigurdsson space between the lines. Ki can find Shelvey with a simple square pass, allowing Swansea to circulate the ball and maintain possession.

Routledge works the channels

It was intelligent of Monk to pair a pacey, mobile natural wide player like Routledge alongside the traditional striker Gomis up front. Because Swansea were in a diamond midfield they had no natural width from their attackers. Routledge provided this width by making runs from inside to outside in the channels behind the Liverpool wing backs Alberto Moreno and Raheem Sterling. At times his final ball left something to be desired but his movement caused Rodgers' side problems. Since they don't play with standard fullbacks, Liverpool leave space in deep areas in the channels. Getting players into these areas to hit accurate crosses into the penalty box is a decent way to attack Liverpool, particularly if you can isolate a tall strong forward on Emre Can at the back post, a center midfielder playing out of position as right-sided center back.

Figure 3: Liverpool's back three leaves space in the channels behind the wing backs Moreno and Sterling .

In the graphic below you can see most of the passes Routledge received were in wide areas. He was particularly active behind Moreno down Liverpool's left, highlighting the idea that Monk may have wanted to hit crosses from the right toward Gomis at the back post against Can. All five of Routledge's crosses were from a similar area on the right channel.

Swansea Press

Monk's shape also allowed his side to press excellently in the opening half. Sigurdsson and one of either Ki or Shelvey would step forward to close down Henderson and Allen. This still left Cork and either Ki or Shelvey in deeper positions to mark Lallana and Coutinho. Liverpool couldn't find an out ball. The pressing forced Allen and Henderson into hurried passes with little forward options to aim. Liverpool struggled to find an out ball to allow them to transition forward. They completed just 38 passes in the attacking third in the first half compared to 49 for Swansea.

Conclusion

Liverpool came into the game and established some control in the second half. That may have had to do with Swansea tiring- it's difficult to maintain a pressing game for 90 minutes. However, had the home side been a bit more inventive and clinical in the final third they could have gone into the second half with a league to hold onto. Although Liverpool were better in the second half they still created little in terms of good scoring opportunities. Although it will matter little for Swansea, their good tactical performance could provide a blueprint for other managers to emulate against the Premier League's in form side.

Three thoughts from 10 man PSG's shock elimination of Chelsea

PSG twice came from a goal behind with headed corners from center backs David Luiz and Thiago Silva to shock Chelsea despite having been reduced to 10 men after Zlatan Ibrahimovic was wrongly sent off in the 31st minute. It was no more than the visiting Parisians deserved- they were the better side throughout and can now look forward to a return to the quarterfinals for the second season running.

1. Excellent Verratti, Pastore, Thiago Motta embarrass Chelsea midfield

Following Ibrahimovic's dismissal PSG moved to something like a 4-3-2 formation when in possession. Mautuidi pushed up alongside Cavani on the left to make penetrating runs in behind the back four. Pastore, Verratti and Thiago Motta formed a midfield three. Those three players worked fantastically well, popping up in gaps between an inexplicably loose Chelsea midfield line that they played comfortably around. Matic, Oscar and Fabregas didn't offer anywhere near the same type of poise, vision and understanding of one another. That three man midfield partnership offered excellent balance for Chelsea at the beginning of the season but has since experienced a pronounced dip in form. Fabregas, charged with linking play from defensive areas forward, looks tired and has been unable to influence games since returning from injury and illness. Matic too seems less able to cover the expanse of ground between the defensive and midfield lines that he was early in the season. Having featured in 38 games this season fatigue may well be a factor in his dip in form. Mourinho has used fewer players in the league this season than any other Premier League team and it's shown in their performances since Christmas. They looked tired and out of sorts tonight, though having gone a week since their last outing fatigue shouldn't have been an issue tonight.

2. Cavani's work rate, versatility make him perfect striker when down to 10 men

Ibrahimovic is far and away the most talented player at PSG. However, if you have to play the majority of the game with ten men, he is maybe the one attacking player you could most live without. I say that because he plays such a specific role on the pitch and isn't especially active both off the ball and in the defensive phase of the game over the course of 90 minutes. Cavani, despite difficulties he's had at PSG, is a tireless worker. He dropped in behind the ball to defend Chelsea's deepest midfielder when PSG were defending. He sprinted into the channels when his side won the ball back to give them a quick countering option forward. He checked back to the ball to link up play during spells of PSG possession and provided a vertical option with runs in behind the Chelsea center backs. Playing with 10 men requires players to take on different responsibilities than they otherwise would with 11 and Cavani was willing to wear a number of different hats for his side. Folks will remember the chance he missed off the post but his work was vital in PSG pulling this out. He's a more versatile player than Ibrahimovic and was therefore more suited to leading the line with ten men.

3. Mourinho must shoulder a major part of blame

It was truly shocking to see Chelsea's front six gesticulating to one another, at a complete loss over who should be picking up which PSG player in what part of the pitch. They didn't have a clue. Perhaps they were confused by the change in positions PSG were forced to make after the red card but it shouldn't have been so difficult a man ahead. Pastore continued to find himself in space in gaps in the midfield. Mourinho has to shoulder at least part of the blame for the tactical set up after going a man ahead. They allowed Motta and Verratti far too much time on the ball and were too lethargic when in possession themselves. Had they gotten higher up the pitch, attacked with pace and purpose and then pressed quickly to win the ball back when they lost it they could have kept PSG in their own half for the bulk of the game. Instead they were slow and retreated into deep positions in defense. They never made PSG feel like they were playing with ten men. Perhaps the lethargy in attack and the unwillingness to press in midfield was down to fatigue, a factor that as discussed earlier also falls on Mourinho for his lack of squad rotation.

Conslusion

PSG were far more deserving of going through. Their performance with ten men was one of the best in Europe in recent memory. Unlike Chelsea's 2-2 draw at Barcelona that saw them through to the 2012 UCL final, this wasn't a backs to the wall job- PSG were the much better side throughout the second half and took the game to Chelsea. For Chelsea, this result had been coming for some time. They simply haven't looked anywhere near the free-flowing, balanced side we saw dominating sides early in the Premier League season. They may well hold on to claim the Premier League title but that is more a reflection of the lack of quality in the Premier League at this time; Chelsea are not an especially good side.

Porto hit 4 world class finishes past Basel, advance to UCL quarterfinals

I made the unfortunate mistake of assuming Real Madrid vs. Schalke was a done deal and watched Porto vs. Basel, too stubborn to switch back over as I saw the wild fluctuating scoreline from Madrid. The quality of Porto's 4 goals in their commanding win offered some consolation however; each came from genuinely world class strikes.

Yacine Brahimi's opener came from a free kick just outside the 18 yard box and was remarkable for how quickly he was able to get his shot up over the wall and then to drop back down again under the crossbar. From such a close distance it's so difficult to get a strike up and down quickly enough but Brahimi's effort dipped comfortably under the bar leaving Tomas Vaclik rooted to his starting position.

Hector Herrera and Vincent Aboubakar, who replaced injured star man Jackson Martinez up top, scored the second and fourth respectively from live play. Herrera tucked inside from the left at the edge of the box and curled a right-footed strike past Vaclik just inside of the far post. Aboubakar bullied both Basel center backs Walter Samuel and Fabian Schar before smashing in a strike inside Vaclik's left post.

Real Madrid loanee Casemiro scored the pick of the bunch with a thunderous free kick from 30 yards out. The Brazilian was excellent throughout and will be key in defensive midfield if Porto are to have any chance at advancing through to the semifinal.

Tactically this penned Basel's 4-2-3-1 versus Porto's 4-3-3.  The midfield matchups were therefore straightforward- Casemiro versus Basel central attacking midfielder Luca Zuffi, Herrera versus Fabian Frei and Evandro Goebel versus Mohamed Elneny. Both sides man marked in these match ups throughout. Porto pressed the Basel deep lying midfielders Frei and Elneny higher up the pitch and for the opening half hour Basel struggled to get any sort of link into the attacking third.

There was about a 10-15 minute spell at the end of the first half when Basel came into the game. Porto's right back Alex Sandro (who had switched sides from left back after starting right back Danilo was knocked unconscious) was playing very narrow. Basel looked to play long diagonal balls into the left channel outside of Sandro. A decent chance fell for Shkelzen Gashi after Zuffi had pulled wide into the left channel to collect a sweeping diagonal ball. Basel's ascendency was brief however and when Herrera added Porto's second Basel never really looked like finding a way back into it.

Paulo Sousa quickly replaced center back Schar with forward Breel Embolo and defensive midfielder Frei for attacking midfielder Yoichiro Kakitani but Basel continued to create little and were left exposed at the back.

Porto look a fairly well balanced side even in the absence of Martinez and could provide a really difficult tie for whoever they draw in the quarterfinals.

Three thoughts on Manchester United's 1-2 defeat to Arsenal

1. United lack midfield creativity

n the first half Van Gaal set his side out in a 4-3-3 with Daley Blind at the base of midfield and Marouane Fellaini and Ander Herrera either side of him in the shuttling midfield roles. United started the game off attacking well enough in this shape. Herrera would create overloads in his right-sided center midfield position with Angel Di Maria down the right channel. Di Maria would cut back onto his left foot and swing crosses towards the back post where Fellaini continually tried to push forward onto Arsenal's left back Hector Bellerin and use his height advantage to win headers. United were fairly bright going forward and equalized after Nacho Monreal's opener for Arsenal from a Di Maria whipped cross to Rooney.

The issue with Van Gaal's 4-3-3 was in defense. With Herrera and Fellaini both shuttling forward into advanced positions, Manchester United were left too open in the center of the pitch when Arsenal won the ball back. Blind was left to defend counterattacks on his own and Arsenal proved dangerous breaking into that space quickly on the counter.

Recognizing United were probably too open, Van Gaal replaced Herrera with Michael Carrick at half time. Carrick sat deeper than Herrera had closer to Blind while Fellaini stayed high up the pitch. United had essentially switched to 4-4-2. While this served to keep United more compact defensively, it also meant they were short on creativity in the middle of the pitch. Whereas a player like David Silva can provide creativity in Manchester City's version of 4-4-2 by tucking inside into gaps of space from the left, both United wide men Di Maria and Young maintained positions in the channels. Fellaini got high up the pitch to win direct balls with Rooney alongside him to get on the end of knock downs. This meant United didn't have a player getting into the gaps of space between the Arsenal center midfielders and center backs. Their only link to the attacking third therefore was through overlapping runs in the channels between fullbacks and wingers and then hitting crosses towards Rooney and Fellaini into the box. In that respect this resembled a United performance under David Moyes.

There's certainly nothing wrong with getting the ball wide and aiming at a big target in the box- it's a strategy Arsenal aren't always convincing defending against. However, with Arsenal employing a tremendously attacking side, a more creative center attacking midfielder would likely have found space to influence the contest. I thought this game was crying out for the introduction of Juan Mata, a player whose clever positioning would have made the still relatively inexperienced Francis Coquelin's day much more difficult. As it turned out, Coquelin didn't have a direct opponent in the second half in midfield and was therefore able to offer cover where needed. This performance will do little to silence critics of Van Gaal's formation tinkering and overall tactics.

2. This was a typically English and typically FA Cup type game

It was entertaining, open, frenetic and often a little sloppy. The crowd roared as the sides took turns attacking one another at speed. Neither side ever really developed any sort of control on the game and in that sense it was a distinctly English game. Nowhere else in Europe's biggest leagues would you witness a game that remained so open without one of the sides making a change to bring some sort of order to proceedings. It was probably fitting that the winner came from a bad individual error- neither side were especially well organized and it was one won by the ability of the individual players rather than a tactical system.

3. United's form worrying

United's next five league games include visits to Tottenham and Chelsea and home clashes with rivals Liverpool and Manchester City. Those five matches will go a long way in determining whether United will secure a place in the Champions League and should bring to light whether the club has improved under Van Gaal. While league wins over Arsenal in November and Liverpool in December were important, they weren't exactly commanding performances. United have yet to put in a truly commanding performance against a top side this season. Five of their final ten fixtures are against opposition currently in the top six. Uninspiring victories over Sunderland and Newcastle in their last two league games after defeat to Swansea mean United aren't exactly experiencing the run of form you'd hope heading into the final months of the season. They'll again face Arsenal at home in the second to last weekend of the league. Van Gaal has his work cut out.

Three thoughts from Chelsea's 2-0 League Cup final win over Spurs

Chelsea's 2-0 win over Spurs gave Jose Mourinho his first trophy in his second spell as Chelsea manager. After a surprisingly open start to the match in which Spurs looked threatening, John Terry put Chelsea ahead just before halftime after Spurs failed to deal with a Willian free kick. From there Chelsea looked far more comfortable playing in front. They defended deeper and played on the break and ultimately got a second through Diego Costa's deflected effort off Kyle Walker. With a two goal cushion the result wasn't in doubt.

Zouma fills holding role well in Matic's absence

With Nemanja Matic missing through suspension, Mourinho opted to use 20 year-old center back Kurt Zouma out of position in Matic's spot at the base of midfield. The absence of Matic, arguably Chelsea's best player this season, was an obvious concern for Chelsea heading into the match. He's played in 37 games in all competitions this season and Chelsea have lost just one of those (a 5-3 lost to today's opponent Spurs at White Hart Lane). Zouma filled in admirably however and provided ample cover in front of a Chelsea back four that was excellent on the day. The young Frenchman kept Christian Eriksen from creating too many decent scoring chances and read the game surprisingly well in an unfamiliar role. On the occasions when his decision making and positioning were wrong, his pace and athleticism allowed him to recover and contest for important challenges. Matic is unique in that he brings an ability to circulate passes in attack that few destroyer holding midfielders can match. It would be a stretch to claim he's equal parts playmaking trequartista and Makele-style destroyer but he is quite tidy in possession. Zouma didn't offer the same options when Chelsea were in possession- he completed just 22 passes- but Mourinho certainly wouldn't have asked much more of him in possession. He performed his role maintaining deep positions and offering support for Cahill and Terry when Spurs were able to quickly transition into attack. He's a less clumsy, more convincing replacement than John Obi Mikel when Matic is unavailable.

Chelsea manage game excellently after quiet start

I was surprised at how open the first 45 minutes were. With Matic missing I expected Ramires to maintain a cautious, deeper position closer to Zouma when Chelsea were in possession to limit the space Tottenham had to counter. Instead, Chelsea operated in more of a 4-3-3 with Fabregas and Ramires both moving into advanced positions. With Zouma the only Chelsea player taking up a deep central midfield position, Spurs had plenty of space to transition into in the center of the pitch. Open contests aren't something Mourinho-coached Chelsea sides typically get themselves involved in, especially in cup competition. Tottenham were unable to take advantage of the space they were afforded but probably looked the more dangerous of the two sides in the opening half.

Terry's opener changed the complexion of the game. With the one goal cushion, Fabregas and Ramires were more conservative with their positioning going forward. The midfield triangle of Fabregas, Ramires and Zouma stayed very compact. This gave Tottenham less space on the break and forced them to show the quality to break down a compact Chelsea defense that is comfortable defending deep with numbers behind the ball. Aside from maybe the final five minutes, Chelsea looked entirely in control defensively. Chelsea patiently soaked up pressure and looked to take their chances on the break as Spurs chased an equalizer. Getting the first goal was massive for Chelsea. They're very good at defending deep and countering and with Spurs having to chase from behind, Mourinho's side knew they'd have chances when they won the ball back and transitioned quickly. Diego Costa's deflected strike off Kyle Walker may have had a hint of good fortune about it but there was no surprise it came from two swift forward passes from Willian and Fabregas. At 2-0 ahead there was little doubt about the final result.

Experience gap proves important

There was a marked contrast in age and big game experience between the two sides. Cech, Terry, Ramires, Ivanovic and Cahill have all played in cup finals with Chelsea; Fabregas has played in two European Championship finals, a World Cup final and a Champions League final as well as numerous domestic cup finals at both Arsenal and Barcelona; Diego Costa helped lead Atletico Madrid to a Champions League final last season (although a hamstring injury meant he only lasted 9 minutes in the final itself). Spurs by contrast had no players with similar big game experience. The average age of their outfield starting 10 players was just 23. Jan Vertonghen was their senior-most outfield player at 27. The gap in experience showed. Chelsea never looked rattled when Spurs enjoyed spells of early possession, they maintained their concentration and kept an organized defensive shape with the lead and knew when and how to go about searching for opportunities to ad to their lead. Spurs never lost their discipline (though Eric Dier was perhaps fortunate not to receive a second yellow before halftime) but they didn't have that experienced player that could inspire a fight back.

Some not referee related thoughts on Chelsea 1-1 Burnley

Ben Mee's 81st minuted headed equalizer from a Burnley corner gave the visiting Clarets a massive 1-1 draw after Nemanja Matic had been sent off for Chelsea for reacting to an Ashley Barnes horror challenge. The main talking points from this contest will center around referee Martin Atkinson's failure to spot Mee's violent studs-raised challenge that would have seen the Burnley forward sent off and two first half Chelsea appeals for penalties that replays suggest were wrongly not given. You'll be able to read about those decisions at length elsewhere so I'll focus instead on some elements of Chelsea's performance independent of the referee.

Tired Chelsea pay for lethargy, lack of ruthlessness

Despite comfortably dominating before the Matic's sending off, Chelsea failed to make their superiority on the pitch reflect on the score sheet. They looked to be expending as little energy as possible to get the three points they were after, something Mourinho-coached sides are generally excellent at at points of season where fixtures are crowded and keeping something left in the energy reserves for future fixtures is important. However, they were made to pay for not more ruthlessly chasing a second that in all likelihood would have killed the game off. Mourinho's lack of squad rotation this season and the possibility that it may be leading to a fatiguing squad  has been discussed by pundits and writers often in the second half of the season and their performance today certainly appeared to be one of a lethargic side. Chelsea started seven of the same players who started the difficult Champions League tie in Paris Tuesday. However, it was rustiness rather than fatigue that plagued Cesc Fabregas and Diego Costa, Chelsea's two most disappointing performers on the day. Fabregas was starting his second cosecutive game after missing through injury and then illness while Costa also just returned this week after a suspension. Fabregas completed 80% of his passes, well below his season average of 87% and provided little in the final third. Costa showed his usual willingness to work off the ball but was poor on it. He completed just 71% off his passes (below a season average of 78%), just 1 of 3 attempted take ons and had just 2 shooting attempts (more on Costa below). Oscar was quiet and Juan Cuadrado's indifferent performances thus far have shown he'll need some time adjusting to a new side before he's a consistent contributor. The thought of having to rely on the individual brilliance of Hazard and a right back for an attacking threat will certainly make Mourinho uneasy. Burnley did not look particularly organized defensively or all that threatening going forward. They were there for the taking and this was a missed opportunity for Chelsea in what should have been one of the easier fixtures of the season. While they are still overwhelming favorites for the title there are hints of some wavering that could suggest it will be a tighter race than anticipated.

Costa's technical shortcomings show

Earlier this season Arsenal manager Arsene Wenger hailed the fighting spirit of his Chilean attacker Alexis Sanchez and Barcelona forward Luis Suarez and suggested that attitude came as a result of growing up playing street football in South America.

"There are similarities between Sanchez and Suarez. Sometimes Suarez will give the ball to the opponent but he gets it back straight away. Sanchez is the same," he said.

Diego Costa certainly fits in that same category. In fact, he relies more heavily on his relentless fighting spirit than either Sanchez or Suarez who are far more gifted technical footballers than the Brazilian-born Costa. His 17 league goals are proof enough he can finish and his movement off the ball is excellent- he works the channels relentlessly to provide outlet passes, gets into the right positions to score goals and allows Chelsea to defend from front to back with his fantastic defensive effort. However, he's a decidedly average player on the ball. He isn't particularly pacey or good at dribbling past opponents like Suarez and Sanchez or Manchester City's Sergio Aguero- all three average far more successful dribbles per game (Costa 1.3, Aguero 2,5, Sanchez 3.4, Suarez 1.5). He's not especially good at linking play forward and providing the final ball for teammates- Aguero, Sanchez and Suarez all have more assists (Costa 2, Suarez 8, Aguero 4, Sanchez 7).

This isn't to disparage Costa. The lack of a solid goal scoring striker was largely responsible for Chelsea's failure to win the league last season and without Costa it's doubtless they wouldn't enjoy the 5 point cushion they have at the top of the league. He was exactly what Mourinho needed. However he is a player that needs to be in the right system to be effective and needs the team to play well for him to play well. Suarez, Aguero and Sanchez have a way of taking a game over on their own with a moment of individual skill. Costa simply doesn't have that and his technical shortcomings have been apparent over the last two games.

Borussia Dortmund’s Horrendous Season in Perspective: Bad Luck or Poor Execution?

After four consecutive seasons finishing first or second in the Bundesliga under Jürgen Klopp’s stewardship, Borussia Dortmund currently sit third from the bottom. Rather than challenging for the league title, the club is in the midst of a relegation battle. 

In the early stages of the season, most fans and commentators tossed up Dortmund’s poor performance to bad luck. However, with nearly three-fifths of the season gone, it seems unlikely that such a poor league position can simply be attributed to bad luck. The frustration of Dortmund’s famously loyal fans finally boiled over after a home loss to Augsburg last week left the club dead last in the league (they have since climbed to 16th with a win over Freiburg).

Borussia Dortmund improved rapidly from a consistently mid-table club to perennial Bundesliga contenders after Klopp took over as manager in the 2008-2009 season. After rebuilding the squad and installing his preferred high-press, counterattacking system throughout his first two seasons, Klopp led Dortmund to back-to-back championships in 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. In 2012-2013, Dortmund finished second in the Bundesliga and lost in the finals of the Champions League, and Dortmund again finished second in the league in 2013-2014.

As quickly as Dortmund rose to the top of the table, their fall to the bottom is even more precipitous. What’s gone wrong with Dortmund? After four plus seasons of playing in Klopp’s high-press, counterattacking system, have the players grown exhausted? Is the team no longer properly implementing his system?

Interestingly, that doesn’t seem to be the case. I calculated the total shots ratio (TSR) for clubs in the Bundesliga since the 2009-2010 season using data from whoscored.com. TSR is simply the number of shots that a team takes in their games divided by the total number of shots in those games. TSR is an indication of how many scoring chances a club creates relative to their opponents. If TSR is greater than 0.5, it means that a club has more than half of the chances in their games. As is clear in the scatterplot, a club’s TSR is correlated with points per game (clubs earn three points for a win, one point for a draw, and none for a loss). The intuition as to why TSR is correlated with points per game is simple: clubs that create more chances than opponents tend to score more goals than opponents and thus win more games.

The yellow dots in the scatterplot represent Dortmund’s TSR vs. points per game for each of the past six seasons. The leftmost yellow dot is from the 2009-2010 season when Dortmund finished fifth. The dot which represents this season for Dortmund is labeled as “BVB 2014-15.” Interestingly, Dortmund’s TSR for this season is quite similar to the previous four seasons in which they finished first or second. However, Dortmund’s actual points per game is far lower than what would be expected based on their TSR (the red line indicates the expected points per game based on TSR). Thus, Dortmund seem to be creating a similar share of the chances in matches (as measured by TSR) compared to their previous four seasons, but they are not translating their shots advantage into a goals advantage.

The difference between Dortmund’s actual points per game and their expected points per game based on TSR is an extreme outlier. To demonstrate this, the absolute value of the residuals for all Bundesliga clubs from 2009-2010 through 2014-2015 (thus far) are plotted. This residual represents the absolute difference between a club’s actual points per game and expected points per game based on TSR. The residual for Dortmund’s 2014-2015 season (plotted in yellow) is considerably larger than any Bundesliga club in this six season period (108 observations in total).

Next, I compare Dortmund’s 2014-2015 residual to the residual for all clubs over the past six seasons (including the current season) in the top four leagues across Europe, which includes the Bundesliga in Germany, La Liga in Spain, the Premier League in England, and Serie A in Italy (468 observations in total). The residuals are based on models estimated separately for each league. Again, the absolute value of Dortmund’s residual is considerably larger than any of the other 467 residuals.

In sum, Dortmund’s system seems to be working similarly to their previous four seasons in terms of the share of chances that they create in matches. However, the difference between their actual points per game and expected points per game based on total shots ratio is massive. No other club over the past six seasons in the top four leagues in Europe (468 club-seasons in total) has experienced a difference of this magnitude between actual points per game and expected points per game! It is tough to diagnose precisely what’s wrong with Dortmund based on this analysis, but the problem does not seem to be rooted in Klopp’s system. Instead, it seems that Dortmund’s league position is likely due to a combination of an extremely low shot conversion rate and an extremely high conversion rate for their opponents. It’s up to you if you want to call it bad luck or poor execution.

Van Persie, Falcao not the right striker pairing for diamond 4-4-2

Daley Blind got a late equalizer to earn Manchester United a slightly fortunate 1-1 draw with West Ham at Upton Park. Louis Van Gaal's side created some good scoring chances in the final 10 minutes after throwing on Marouane Fellaini and adopting a direct approach but they looked bereft of ideas in the attacking third for much of the game despite boasting a starting 11 that included Wayne Rooney, Angel Di Maria, Adnan Januzaj, Falcao and Robin Van Persie.

Machester United's major issue in the attacking third seemed to be a lack of any type of threat from wide areas. They never got in behind West Ham's fullbacks Carl Jenkinson and Aaron Creswell and forced them to turn towards their own goal. As a result, Creswell and Jenkinson were able to maintain narrow positions close to their center backs making it very difficult for Man United to play any penetrating passes between gaps in the West Ham back four.

That lack of width was in large part due to Van Gaal's use of a diamond 4-4-2 which naturally doesn't provide for width from the midfield. Angel Di Maria played at the tip of the diamond with Van Persie and Falcao up front; behind them Rooney and Januzaj played the shuttling roles and Blind sat deep in front of the back four. A diamond midfield is a system that can allow for possession dominance because with four midfielders in narrow positions there is generally going to be an unmarked player to pass to. However, it's also a system that requires dynamic movement from the two front men to work the channels in order to provide the width that can stretch defenses. Falcao and Van Persie don't provide that sort of dynamic movement. Both are happy to drop off deep into central areas in midfield to get on the ball but neither make runs in behind the opposition fullbacks. This lack of a threat in behind on the channels allows the opposition fullbacks to support their center backs in central areas and makes the penalty area crowded enough that it becomes very difficult for the attacking side to play their way through.

The graphic below shows the passes received by Falcao and Van Persie over the 90 minutes. When they received the ball in wide positions it was deep in midfield towards the halfway line, not in dangerous areas behind the fullbacks. Both players received passes in the channels in the attacking third just twice. As a result, all of Manchester United's possession was happening in front of the West Ham back four making it very comfortable on them- they were rarely forced to turn their backs and sprint to towards their own goal to track Manchester United runners.

I think if Van Gaal is going to continue with the diamond 4-4-2 he needs to use one striker that offers a little more movement into the channels and behind the opposition back four. James Wilson isn't yet the talent that Van Persie or Falcao are but he's more suited to operating alongside one of the two star strikers in a diamond 4-4-2 than the two are to playing alongside one another. He brings a pace and willingness to make diagonal runs behind the opposition fullbacks that give the side much more of a vertical threat. Manchester United are a less rigid, static side when he is in the squad.

The movement of Di Maria in his role at the tip of the diamond was also a bit disappointing. His pace and crossing ability make him a dangerous threat in wide areas, which we saw glimpses of when Van Gaal changed systems near the end, but I thought he could have done more to move across the width of the pitch to create overloads in the channels. Instead, he maintained fairly narrow positions and received the bulk of passes in the middle of the pitch. Di Maria is a better player when he is able to receive the ball in space and run at the defense. He is not an especially clever passer in crowded central areas and with West Ham defending compact and narrow it was a situation he found himself in frequently today. It was a #10 role that would have better suited Juan Mata, a player comfortable finding pockets of space in tight areas and finding clever penetrating passes.

Van Gaal has yet to find the right system for his side. For a squad with such an embarrassment of attacking riches, too often they struggle to convert possession dominance into goal scoring opportunities. Strangely, it is that abundance of attacking options that is probably partly to blame for Manchester United's occasional tepid attacking displays as Van Gaal attempts to adopt formations that get as many of his star attackers on the field at the expense of a system that will create more cohesion going forward.

Importance of Costa's movement apparent in Chelsea win over QPR

Even with the absence of Diego Costa in recent weeks due to his persistent hamstring injury, Chelsea's excellent run of form continued. They won three and drew one during Costa's four game absence yet didn't played with quite the same dynamism in the attacking third.

Today we saw just how much Costa adds to the Chelsea attack. He works tirelessly on the defensive side to close opposition defenders and not allow them to play out from the back, his strength and hold up play are excellent, he works the channels in the space in behind the opposition fullbacks, his diagonal runs give Chelsea a threat in behind the defense and he has the quality in front of foal to finish off a move.

Within the opening minute Costa chased a lost cause into the corner flag to win a corner off of Richard Dunne. Later he made an intelligent diagonal run in behind QPR's high line only for Nemanja Matic to take an extra touch causing Costa to be offside.

He's formed a fine understanding with fellow new signing Cesc Fabregas. Fabregas has the quality to pick out Costa's runs behind the opposition back four with well weighted balls over the top, as evidenced by Costa's goal in the Arsenal fixture from a Fabregas long ball. Oscar's opener today was a world class piece of individual skill but he was able to get into the space to take on the shot due to some fantastic movement and combination play from Fabregas and Costa that pulled QPR's back four out of position.

The screen shots below show the build up to Oscar's goal. In the first, Fabregas has just received a pass from Matic in midfield. Costa drops into the space behind QPR's holding midfielders Sandro and Karl Henry which forces center back Steven Caulker to step out from the back four and opens up the space between Richard Dunne and left back Yun Suk-Young. Costa holds up play well after receiving the pass from Fabrgas.

Fabregas has the awareness to try to get into the space Caulker has vacated. He receives a short pass from Costa and gets in behind Caulker. This forces Yun to tuck inside to close down Fabregas. Oscar is able to take advantage of the space that opens up on the outside of Yun. He still has plenty to do and the finish is sublime but the space he finds himself in is a product of Chelsea's intelligent movement of which Costa plays a key role.

Chelsea were ultimately made to work hard for the three points after Charlie Austin's clever flicked equalizer. Hazard provided the winner from the penalty spot having earned the penalty, just as he did against Arsenal. If there's been a concern for Chelsea this season it's been a tendency at times to not kill off games that they're seemingly in control of. They lost points late to Manchester United and ten men Manchester City but also made harder work of it than they needed to today as well as in the 2-1 win over Crystal Palace when a late Fraizer Campbell goal made for a nervy finish. Mourinho voiced his displeasure at Chelsea's performance in the post match interview and he'll look for his side to finish off weaker opposition early. Still, these were the type of fixtures the Blues dropped points in last season and they can take some satisfaction in having found a winner against a well organized QPR side.

Thoughts on Liverpool 1-1 Everton

Phil Jagielka's incredible stoppage time volley gave Everton a share of the spoils at Anfield after Steven Gerrard put Liverpool ahead with a vintage 65th minute free kick.

The most interesting tactical feature of the match was in the wide areas- Roberto Martinez played Romelu Lukaku wide on the right and kept him high up the pitch and Brendan Rodgers played Raheem Sterling wide on the left to use his pace to run at 33 year old Everton right back Tony Hibbert, making his first league start in over 600 days.

Lukaku wide right

Using Lukaku wide on the right has become a more common feature of Martinez's lineups this season. He used it for the first time last season in Everton's 3-0 win over Arsenal, a game in which Lukaku terrorized Nacho Monreal and Thomas Vermaelen on the left side of Arsenal's defense and employed it again in the 2-2 draw with Arsenal this season.

Everton used a 4-3-3 shape today with Gareth Barry sitting in front of the back four with Muhamed Besic and James McCarthy either side of him. They defended with a midfield bank of four- James McCarthy slid to the widest position on the right of the midfield four, responsible for tracking Liverpool left back Alberto Moreno. This allowed Lukaku to stay higher up the pitch in a position down the right channel, free from the responsibility of running with Moreno. Moreno plays high up the pitch when Liverpool are in possession, meaning he was leaving space in behind him on Liverpool's left. Everton looked to play quick outlet passes into Lukaku in this area. Those outlet passes forced Dejan Lovren to move into the channels to close Lukaku down, leaving a gap of space between himself and Martin Skrtel. Steven Naismith and Kevin Mirallas (then Aiden McGeady when Mirallas went off injured) were responsible for making runs from deeper positions into that gap to finish off moves.

There were a few moments in the first half when Everton looked dangerous employing that strategy but for the most part Moreno did well to make recovery runs and Lovren did enough when forced to close Lukaku down in the channels. Everton were certainly hurt by the injury to Mirallas. He's far more dynamic with his runs from outside to in than is McGeady. They lacked the threat of his direct vertical running and willingness to get into the box.

Sterling vs Hibbert

Raheem Sterling has typically played at the top of a midfield diamond for Liverpool this season but with Daniel Sturridge still missing through injury, Rodgers opted to play a lone striker in a 4-2-3-1 shape. Adam Lallana played behind Mario Balotelli in the #10 role with Sterling taking up a position on the left wing. It was easy to see Rodgers' thinking- with Hibbert in the side at right back for Everton Sterling had a massive speed advantage down that side and was expected to run at Hibbert at every opportunity. Hibbert was beaten for pace on a few occasions but fared reasonably well considering how infrequently he's played over the last two seasons. However, Liverpool could have killed the game off when Sterling easily dribbled past the Everton right back and crossed for Balotelli only for his effort to be saved brilliantly onto the bar by Tim Howard.

Final thoughts

For a Merseyside derby, this was surprisingly a slow burner, particularly given the attacking nature of both managers. Both sides were reasonably compact throughout meaning it never really opened up and we didn't get the loud roars from the crowd usually heard in the closing stages of big derbies. Lukaku and Balotelli both mistimed headers that could have led to goals and Balotelli hit the bar but aside from that there were few really clear cut chances. Both goals came from moments of individual skill rather than brilliant team play.

Man City, Dortmund matches highlight Arsenal's glaring weakness at base of midfield

That Arsenal are in need of a strong, tough tackling holding midfielder has been repeated enough by pundits and journalists over the last couple of seasons that it has become something of a banal argument. Unfortunately for Arsenal supporters such an oft-repeated argument is likely to have some truth to it and over the club's last two games the lack of a midfielder capable of protecting the back four has been glaringly obvious. 

At the weekend Mathieu Flamini played the holding role and failed to track Sergio Aguero's run from deep in midfield leading to Manchester City's opener. Today, Arsenal stuck with the same 4-3-3 (or 4-1-4-1 if you prefer) formation as the City game. This time it was Mikel Arteta at the base of midfield with Jack Wilshere and Aaron Ramsey on either side of him further up the pitch. The number of times the likes of Henrikh Mkhitaryan, Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang and Ciro Immobile were able to get on the ball for Dortmund in behind the Arsenal midfield and run at the two center backs was staggering. Those three players are pacey and direct. Arteta has never been especially quick and at 33 it's a massive ask of him to be responsible for slowing down the counters of a side that breaks with the exceptional speed and directness of Dortmund.

It's easy to second guess Wenger after the fact but it's puzzling that he hasn't seemed to address just how much defensive pressure his new 4-1-4-1 formation, with Ramsey taking on a role higher up the pitch than last season, puts on the holding midfielder- either Flamini or Arteta, both of whom are not mobile enough to fulfill that role. Against opposition that likes to patiently build from the back and have a lot of possession I think it'll work fine- Arsenal will have the time to get numbers behind the ball and the holding midfielder won't be left as exposed- but against sides that can break forward as quickly as Man City and Dortmund it leaves Arsenal vulnerable on the counter. The shape looks decent defensively when Arsenal have the time to get players behind the ball. They're actually defending with three in the middle of midfield and leaving just Welbeck up front, rather than defending with banks of four and leaving both Ozil and the striker high as they did last season. That extra body in the midfield bank of five allows Wilshere and Ramsey to press the ball and Arteta to sit in the hole behind them, denying the opposition space between the lines. However, the issues have arisen when Arsenal concede possession in the opposition's defensive half. With both Wilshere and Ramsey moving into advanced positions in the attacking third, there is space either side the holding midfielder for the opposition to play outlet passes into and break forward quickly. Once they get the ball in these spaces it's down to Mertesacker and Koscielny to come up big.

Perhaps against a side that likes to play as vertically on the break as Dortmund, the answer for Arsenal should have been to get behind the ball, allow Dortmund more possession and play a bit more on the break. Arsenal had 56% possession but as they kept the ball and advanced up the pitch they were playing into the hands of Dortmund's relentless midfield press and quick countering style.

Uli Hesse's excellent history of England vs. Germany club rivalry in European competition

"During the next decade, clubs from the two countries traded blows quite evenly. In 1965, Liverpool and Cologne contested a truly epic European Cup quarterfinal. Two scoreless draws necessitated a one-game playoff staged in Rotterdam. On a muddy pitch, Ian St. John and Roger Hunt gave the Reds a 2-0 lead, but Karl-Heinz Thielen pulled one back with a header from a free kick and then Hannes Lohr tied the game with a shot from more than 20 yards. Fifteen minutes from time, Heinz Hornig scored another goal for Cologne, but it was disallowed for a supposed Thielen foul in the build-up. Television replays strongly suggested the decision was wrong.

This was the famous game in which Wolfgang Weber broke his calf bone after 20 minutes in a collision with Gordon Milne, didn't realise the severity of his injury and battled on -- through regulation time and, incredibly, also extra time. In those days before penalty shootouts, Weber then could do nothing else but watch -- in both mental and physical pain, one presumes -- as Belgian referee Robert Schaut tossed a coin to decide the tie. It landed sideways in the mud. Schaut tossed it again, and when Weber saw Liverpool captain Ron Yeats leaping into the air he knew his team were out of the competition."

Uli Hesse recounts the history of the rivalry between English and German club sides in European competition in his excellent piece for ESPN FC.

This week's Champions League fixtures pin England versus Germany three times. Dortmund and Arsenal square off at the Westfalenstadion today, the fifth time the clubs have met in the last three years, while tomorrow Manchester City travel to Munich to face Bayern and Chelsea host Schalke.